New START Expiration
On February 3, 2026, CSIS Defense and Security Department experts examined New START’s expiration, how U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals will evolve, and what the implications are for U.S. and global security.
In Depth Analysis, Commentary, and Publications
On February 3, 2026, CSIS Defense and Security Department experts examined New START’s expiration, how U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals will evolve, and what the implications are for U.S. and global security.
On January 22, 2026, CSIS Defense and Security Department experts discussed the Secretary of War’s Arsenal of Freedom tour, intended to bolster the defense industrial base and accelerate defense-related production.
On December 17, 2025, the CSIS Missile Defense Project is pleased to roll out its new brief, The Depleting Missile Defense Interceptor Inventory.
On December 10, 2025, CSIS Defense and Security Department experts weighed in on the recently released National Security Strategy.
The proliferation of missile threats has made air and missile defense interceptors the table stakes for entry into future conflicts, forcing the Department of Defense to either ante up and buy the necessary interceptors, or fold on its regional interests and bear the consequences.
On November 19, 2025, CSIS Defense and Security Department experts examined the ongoing debate over whether the Trump administration's Golden Dome initiative undermines strategic stability.
The Trump administration’s Golden Dome initiative is both strategically necessary and long overdue. It is also already in jeopardy of failure. The reason? A lack of dialogue and persuasion. If the Pentagon does not start explaining Golden Dome, it will never be built.
On November 4, 2025, CSIS Defense and Security Department experts broke down Netflix's "A House of Dynamite," exploring lessons learned, what it gets right and wrong, and how it can inform conversations about national security.
Nuclear-powered cruise missiles are not a new idea—they’re just a bad idea. While Russia’s Burevestnik missile is grabbing headlines, it does not fundamentally change Russia’s ability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk or the strategic balance between the two states.
In discussions on missile defense, the matter of countermeasures—decoy warheads and other deceptive missile payloads—is often invoked but insufficiently explored. For decades, popular commentators assumed that adversaries could readily develop countermeasures capable of defeating U.S. missile defense systems. With Russia and China having deployed missile defense countermeasures in their nuclear arsenals, it was assumed that...