AnalysisReports

Countermeasures, Penetration Aids, and Missile Defense

October 17, 2025

In discussions on missile defense, the matter of countermeasures—decoy warheads and other deceptive missile payloads—is often invoked but insufficiently explored. For decades, popular commentators assumed that adversaries could readily develop countermeasures capable of defeating U.S. missile defense systems.1 With Russia and China having deployed missile defense countermeasures in their nuclear arsenals, it was assumed that Iran and North Korea could rapidly and easily follow suit.2

As combat missile interceptions become more frequent, these questions are worth revisiting.3 Are countermeasures effective, and how easily can states develop them? Recent experience has felled many past assumptions on missile defense performance; does the same potential exist for literature on countermeasures, which overwhelmingly cite an assessment written a quarter-century ago?4 U.S.-built defenses have intercepted Russian countermeasure-equipped missiles in Ukraine. How should these observations affect analytic confidence on how militaries deploy countermeasures?

Open debates on countermeasure performance often seem difficult to resolve. Many key performance parameters needed for robust analysis are classified, leaving open analysts to use hypotheticals on how effective countermeasures could be built. Less certain is how these mechanisms survive contact with reality. Popular descriptions of these systems as simple balloons or metal wire elide the challenges in procuring even the simplest military hardware. Empirical narratives—such as on the United Kingdom’s troubled Chevaline program—suggest that building robust countermeasures can be an expensive, protracted affair.5 It is not, as the Union of Concerned Scientists argue, “specious” to propose that developing reliable countermeasures may be difficult; in Congressional hearings and elsewhere, decisionmakers routinely struggled with what levels of countermeasure performance—and confidence—would be acceptable.6

A short, descriptive account of states’ countermeasure development can help contribute to this debate. To date, comprehensive histories have been rare—no doubt because of challenges posed by classification. Without empirical evidence on countermeasure development, evaluating their impact on the strategic balance will remain, as the National Research Council has emphasized, “uncertain business.”7

Taxonomizing countermeasures

A precise definition of “countermeasures” is one which encompasses a broad variety of devices and techniques to defeat missile defense. These may include the employment of penetration aids, a category of missile payloads designed to confuse or disrupt missile defense sensors; modifications to a missile’s warhead; the deployment of maneuvering or multiple warheads; or operational changes which prioritize attacks on missile defense assets. Yet for the purposes of this report, which include consistency with prior debates, the terms countermeasure and penetration aid will be used interchangeably.

A look through Russian histories or Congressional budget requests reveals that many approaches to penetrating missile defense have been tried. Just one approach, decoying, can represent a bewildering variety of system types. Decoys can be built on an operating principle of replicating real warheads (imitation), or enveloping and disguising them (antisimulation).8 They can be built with heavy thermal shielding to reenter the atmosphere convincingly— to confuse terminal defenses—or built as fragile inflatable structures, deployed in large numbers, and encountering no air resistance while traveling through space. They can be built to perfectly replicate warheads in size and shape, or to do so imperfectly, but in far larger numbers—so-called “traffic decoys,” or, more colorfully, “fairly elegant garbage.”9 Combinations of these types and philosophies, additionally, are possible, with lightweight decoys employing “little rockets…to push them down further into the atmosphere” and better replicate the reentry deceleration of real warheads, or systems which incorporate electronic jammers.10 A look at these narratives, and their sources, only partly captures the deep variety of designs available.

Table 1. Taxonomy of countermeasures11

TypeClassOperating RegimePrincipleExamples
Light replica decoyPenetration aidExoatmosphericImitationThrusted Replica Decoy (TREP)12
Heavy replica decoyPenetration aidBothImitationOptical Particle Decoy (OPADEC)13, HAPDEC (Hard Point Decoy)14
Traffic decoyPenetration aidBothImitationUnspecified dart and nesting penetration aids, presented to Congress, 197815
Enveloping balloon decoyPenetration aidExoatmosphericAntisimulationMultiple types tested by ABRES
Electronic countermeasuresPenetration aidBothActive jammingAtlas Active ECM16
ChaffPenetration aidBothObscurationMk-12 chaff system17
AerosolsPenetration aidExoatmosphericObscurationHAVE LENT IV penaids18
Pyrotechnic/
plasma generators		Penetration aidEndoatmosphericObscuration“Pyro” decoy19
Radiation hardeningPassive countermeasureBothHardeningMK12 reentry vehicle
RCS reductionPassive countermeasureBothConcealmentLow Observable Re-entry Vehicle (LORV)20
Non-standard trajectoriesActive countermeasureExoatmosphericEvasionMK12 reentry vehicle depressed-trajectory mode21
MaRVs, HGVActive countermeasureEndoatmosphericEvasionAMaRV, MK500 Evader, ABALL22
Multiple warheadsActive countermeasureBothExhaustionPoseidon/MK3, PAVE PEPPER (7-warhead Minuteman II configuration)23
Attack on missile defense assetsPreemptive attackEndoatmosphericSuppressionDRADS (Degradation of Radar Defense Systems)24
DSV (Defense Suppression Vehicle)25

The United States’ countermeasure program

U.S. work on missile defense countermeasures is nearly as old as ballistic missile defense itself. The first studies on missile defense penetration took place in the early 1950s, and by 1957, multiple federal advisory boards, including the Gaither Committee, President’s Scientific Advisory Council (PSAC), and Department of Defense Reentry Body Identification Group (RBIG), had begun identifying key concepts, like decoying, chaff, jamming, and other techniques commonly used in such systems.26 By 1958, when the first full-scale ICBM flight test with an ablative, conical reentry vehicle had taken place (Thor-Able), the Air Force had experimented with using the controlled breakup of ICBM sustainer tanks as a rudimentary penetration aid.2728 Initially deemed impractical, such a system later entered service with a variety of Air Force liquid-fueled ICBMs.


That same year, the Air Force began its earliest formal work on dedicated missile defense countermeasures.29 To support this burgeoning work on missile defense and defense penetration, the Department of Defense began developing the TRADEX measurement radar on Kwajalein Atoll in 1959, which would rapidly expand to become a series of measurement radar sites on Roi-Namur in the following years.3031 By 1960, the Lincoln Lab, under Department of Defense contract, began its first study of penetration aids.32 Flights of rudimentary decoys and chaff allegedly took place during this formative period.33


Air Force penetration aids work rapidly accelerated in 1961 alongside updated intelligence estimates on Soviet ABM capability.34 In that year, new PSAC analysis expressed concern that U.S. ballistic missile penetration would “not be sufficiently assured” after 1963.35 Another panel, in the Air Force’s Ballistic Systems Division, suggested combining slender, radar cross-section-reduced reentry vehicles, “precursor” nuclear detonations upon reentry, decoys, and nuclear detonation-hardened warheads, with the Strategic Air Command additionally recommending deployment of penetration aids for the Titan II and Minuteman I systems.36 The Navy, meanwhile, awarded its first contract to develop penetration aids for forthcoming sea-based missiles, which incorporated “six decoys, [midcourse] chaff…and electronic jammers for the early part of atmospheric reentry.”37

By March of 1962, General Bernard Schreiver, architect of the Air Force’s ICBM program, urged Air Force headquarters to consolidate and accelerate missile defense penetration efforts, noting the “apparent lack of urgency, vigor, and management attention to the ballistic missile penetration program.”38 By spring of that year, the Air Force would combine separate reentry vehicle and penetration aid development into a central program.39 At the same time, DARPA commenced its first dedicated penetration aids program; within a year, the Air Force and DARPA efforts would quickly be combined into a single effort, the Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems (ABRES) program.4041 On May 14, 1963, ABRES would be transitioned to become the Department of Defense-wide effort for advanced countermeasures development.42

ABRES, which operated jointly but was managed by the Air Force, would remain the central coordinator for early-stage countermeasures development for decades. The program would become responsible for development of ballistic reentry vehicles, novel, maneuvering reentry systems—the precursors of modern hypersonic weapons—and dedicated countermeasures, to include decoys and chaff. Additionally, ABRES would maintain an independent flight test campaign to ensure “a technology reservoir of dedicated penetration concepts that operational systems…can draw on to meet specific operational objectives.”43 Advanced systems developed and tested in ABRES would eventually be transitioned to respective program offices, such as to Minuteman or Polaris.44

Image 1. ABRES Funding over time, 2024 dollars

CPI Adjustment performed with 2024 St. Louis Fed CPI deflators.

By the mid-1960s, ABRES had performed dozens of flight tests to mature penetration aid concepts, launching Athena test vehicles from the Green River site to White Sands Missile Range, and full-scale Minuteman I surplus vehicles to Kwajalein.4546 Contemporary reports listed dozens of ongoing contracts related to missile defense penetration, including studies on a “homing radar-attack” maneuvering reentry vehicle, flight tests for low-observable reentry vehicle technologies, PX-series electronic countermeasures for Polaris, and decoy warhead plasma wake studies, which characterized the signatures of replica decoys.47


By mid-1965, Titan II force had been equipped with “rudimentary” exoatmospheric and terminal decoys, Minuteman I forces were equipped with rockets to separate the warhead from the final stage, and Atlas F decoys were in production.48 Even so, both the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and Air Force Headquarters “expressed concern about the leisurely pace” of development and that more emphasis ought be placed on “development of effective decoys.”49 By late in 1965, the Secretary of Defense ordered an urgent program for countermeasure development, initiating development of the Mk-1 and Mk-12 penetration aid systems for the Minuteman missile, and additional decoys. While Mk-1 would deploy 9 chaff clouds, Mk-12 would deploy “heavy” chaff in multiple intervals until a 60km altitude floor was reached.50


While the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development would testify that “advances in reentry penetration aids [would be] sufficient to overcome what the Tallinn system [suspected Soviet ABM system] might do,” contemporary histories suggested that “fitting Air Force strategic missiles with penetration aids proved a slow process” from 1965 to 1967.51 In multiple flight tests, ABRES developed and tested small-RV systems, new materials for reentry vehicles, and on hardening reentry vehicles against nuclear detonations.52 However, by 1967, only the Titan II force had dedicated countermeasure systems. In tests, the Mk-1 chaff dispenser for Minuteman “did not fully screen the reentry body” and “remained somewhat erratic in its ability to conceal the Minuteman third stage” even after modifications.53 While these errors were deemed acceptable for the time, the task of deploying chaff from a non-maneuvering Minuteman II upper stage was more difficult than later, Minuteman III-based solutions, which employed its maneuvering post-boost vehicle (PBV) to more precisely dispense chaff.54 By then, U.S. decisionmakers had realized that achieving optimal decoy and chaff deployment would entail the development of a maneuvering bus—effectively; to develop MIRV.55 From the start, MIRV and effective penetration aid development were deeply entwined.


Indeed, as these developments occurred, the “support within the Air Force technical community had swung sharply away from decoys and toward MIRV.”56 In 1965, an influential DARPA study, Pen-X, concluded that MIRV would effective for future defense penetration, with chaff and other countermeasure systems playing a supporting role.57 MIRV systems already imposed similar weight penalties on missiles; much like a MIRV bus, “chaff and decoys were bulky”, and could “increase [payload] weight by a factor of about three.” In brief, adding a MIRVed warhead was “almost like putting a weapon inside of a decoy”—similar in cost, but with higher assurance of penetration. With funding pressure from the growing Vietnam war and doubts about performance, the Air Force opted to procure only 150 Mk-1 countermeasure systems, planning to employ the more-reliable Mk-1A chaff dispenser for 1969 deployment.58 The first wing of penetration-aid-equipped Minuteman II systems began receiving Mk-1 chaff dispensers from 1967 to 1968.59 By 1969, however, Mk-1A deployments were postponed pending further indications of Soviet activity.60


Through the late 1960s, ABRES funding levels and activity increased, with more than 100 unique efforts ongoing and development programs for new, deep-penetrating heavy decoys.61 These included new, broad-spectrum jammers, including ones “which adapted transmission to interrogation pulse” and could operate in the harsh plasma environments of atmospheric reentry; active decoys that could transmit response signals, and lightweight decoys that could more convincingly replicate the ballistic profiles of heavier ones.62 Other concepts, such as on countermeasures to infrared detection, also began, along with continuing funding lines for maneuvering reentry vehicles (MaRVs) like the MK500 “Evader” system, the Maneuvering Ballistic Reentry Vehicle, Advanced Control Experiment, and a flap-based MaRV that would become the Advanced MaRV, which could mitigate the threat posed by terminal-phase missile defenses.63


Even so, in 1970 the Department of Defense “defer[red] the demonstration of selected [deleted] countermeasure techniques…and [limited] the ABRES program to technology development rather than prototype demonstration.” in this period.64 While ABRES would develop a “mix of available penetration options” to include MaRVs, “small multiple reentry vehicles…decoys, electronic and optical countermeasures, advanced chaff,” and others, “primary emphasis [was] placed on the terminal evasion maneuvering vehicle program” through 1973.65 In Fiscal 1973 budget discussions, ABRES programmed $8 million for the Advanced Control Experiment, $13 million for the Small Evader Experiment, and $3.5 million to the Small Evader Vehicle—all MaRV efforts.66 That same year, ABRES was to spend $3 million on optical countermeasures, $1.8 million on electronic countermeasures, and $2 million on decoys.67

By the mid-1970s, the MK500 Evader MaRV had been flight tested four times, while PAVE PEPPER, a concept for up to seven small reentry vehicles on Minuteman III, had been flight tested twice, and ABRES had embarked on “development of a penetration aid package of traffic decoys” for strategic systems.68 Several traffic decoy concepts, “packaged in small glass cylinders” or “like a rabbit ear antenna on a television set…with a very heavy little dart on the nose to help it penetrate deep into the atmosphere,” remained under development in this period.69


MaRV investments drove investment in other countermeasures. Testifying to Congress in 1974, Air Force leadership attested that it was “essential to the concept of such evading vehicles that they be accompanied by decoys; later, in 1976, that ABRES focused “primarily on decoys for maneuvering reentry vehicles.”70 In another statement, ABRES officials testified that “effective maneuvering for evasion requires the use of penetration aids.”71 Indeed, by 1975, no decoy was yet available to accompany the Mk500 MaRV, with two concepts under investigation through that period.7273 By 1976, meanwhile, ABRES initiated its Advanced MaRV program, a more accurate MARV capable of replicating MK500’s performance with a higher degree of accuracy.74 By 1977, ABRES budget justifications noted that traffic decoy concepts predominated investments in non-MaRV countermeasure technologies.75


By 1978, the United States had spent more than $1.9 billion ($9.4 billion, 2024 dollars) on ABRES. Despite the passage of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 1973, investment in penetration aid technology had only increased.76 By 1978, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Bill Perry had testified that the Soviet ABM program had intensified, and that ABRES had continued efforts on advanced chaff, lightweight decoys, and novel electronic countermeasures.77 Later, in 1979, ABRES conducted two flight tests of Star, a decoy, performed two additional tests demonstrating “aerosol masking dispensers as penetration aids,” and performed its first flight test, a partial success, of AMaRV.78


The 1980s marked a significant increase in investment on countermeasures, both to MaRV systems but also to decoys, chaff, and other penetration aids. ABRES, renamed the Advanced Strategic Missile Systems program in June 1981, continued to perform “significant works” on decoy development and plasma sheath and wake simulation, and flight tested a novel “Electronic Replica Decoy” (ERD) in this period.7980 In 1980, an unspecified penetration aid was planned for flight test, and in 1981, AMaRV completed three flight tests, ending its test campaign.81 In 1980 and 1988, ASMS developed replica decoys for MK500 and other MaRV systems, and in 1984, “sophisticated dispensing devices and deployment” systems for advanced chaff, testing “well over a dozen” payloads in flight tests.82 In 1983, ASMS awarded contracts to develop next-generation Minuteman III and Peacekeeper decoy and chaff systems, and perfomed early concept studies on a Defense Suppression Vehicle, a maneuvering reentry vehicle intended to home into and attack BMD systems.838485 Among these flight tests, ASMS apparently planned three decoy development flight tests in fiscal 1985 and two Peacekeeper penetration aid dispenser tests in fiscal 1986 and 1987.”8687 In addition, ASMS developed novel pyrotechnic decoys, testing a rocket-equipped decoy that created a bright infrared and optical plume, to face the emerging challenge of Soviet optical missile defense sensors.8889 By 1987, the Air Force had successfully ground-tested new active decoys, an “Evader replica penetration aid,” and new pyrotechnic decoys.90


By 1985, candidate Peacekeeper and Minuteman III decoys successfully complete a campaign of three flight tests, with a Peacekeeper penetration aid deployment system (PADS) “flown with both active and passive decoys” later that year.91 In 1988, ASMS initiated flight tests for the pyrotechnic decoy, “Pyrotechnic Phase II”, along with cancelling ongoing “Broad Area Optics” and “Gossamer structures” programs, which intended to develop “thin film materials…for optical and radar masking of decoys and RVs.”92


The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic restructuring of the ASMS program. Renamed Ballistic Missile Technology after 1992, funding declined from a peak of roughly $7.7 billion (2024 dollars) in Fiscal 1989 to $285 million (2024 dollars) in Fiscal 1995.939495 In 1997, the Ballistic Missile Technology program, then reoriented to “integrated demonstration of advanced guidance, navigation, and control packages for ballistic missiles,” was eliminated.96 While Congressional funding additions kept the program afloat for several years, integrating ballistic missile GPS guidance, accelerometer, and range safety technologies, funding to the effort finally ceased in 2008.97

The Soviet Countermeasure Program

Few accounts of the Soviet countermeasure program exist in Western literature. Russian-language sources, including the personal retrospectives of key figures like G.V. Kisunko, can shed some light on Soviet and Russian developments. The following is a fragmentary account of what is publicly known on Soviet missile defense countermeasure [КСП ПРО] development.


Like the United States, Soviet research and thought on countermeasures began in the mid-1950s with feasibility studies being performed by the Central Scientific Research Institute-108 (TsNII-108) on methods to “counteract enemy anti-missile interceptors by using special radio absorption coatings, decoys, dipole reflectors [chaff], and active jamming systems.”98 Later renamed the Central Radiotechnical Research Institute (TsNIRTI), the organization apparently played a major role in Soviet countermeasures work.99 Other entities involved included OKB-586 (later, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau), and the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology.100 Indeed, by 1958, TsNII-108 was designated a lead institution for countermeasures development, with its Sector 3 becoming its central countermeasures research division in 1959.101102

In 1958, TsNIRTI initiated its first countermeasure projects: Willow [Верба], Cactus [Кактус], and Mole [Крот].103104105 The Willow system, involving inflatable decoys, apparently “led to the creation of lightweight inflatable decoys and masking dipole reflectors”—rudimentary decoys and chaff.106 Invented by Pavel Pogorelko, the system involved “hundreds” of inflatable reflectors, which were apparently folded into cylindrical dispensers.107 The Cactus effort, in TsNIRTI accounts, focused on radar-reducing coatings for nuclear warheads, which allegedly reduced radar cross section by a factor of ten.108109 Finally, Mole, an electronic jamming system, demonstrated “unsatisfactory progress” by 1961, leading to a change in project leadership. Beginning in 1961, V.M Gerasimenko led the succeeding Mole-1 project, selecting two active jamming circuits, a “continuous noise jammer” and “pulse response noise jammer” to defeat ground-based missile defense radars and radiofrequency interceptor seekers, respectively.110

In mid-1961, TsNIRTI and Special Design Bureau-30 (OKB-30) flight tested the Willow, Cactus, and Mole systems on R-5 missiles against the experimental System A missile defense system at Sary Shagan. In System A design chief Grigory Kisunko’s account, the countermeasures did not perform conclusively: System A operators could distinguish Willow inflatable decoys and intercepted the incoming missile early, concluding the test; Cactus “did not open” in flight, and the Mole jamming system was defeated by new radar pulsing tactics.111 Other accounts suggest that the upgraded Mole system was ground and flight tested from 1962 to 1963.112


TsNIRTI’s own history only discusses Willow, Cactus, and Mole flight testing through 1963, with a series of twelve flight tests (four per countermeasure) of R-12 missiles at Kasputin Yar.113114115 It is not clear if these tests were assessed as successful; the three projects concluded “in the second half of 1963 and were highly appreciated by the State Commission.”116 The results of these early demonstrations validated internal debates on the feasibility of a larger penetration aids program.117


It is the period after these initial tests that TsNIRTI considered “the stage of formation” for the missile defense and countermeasures field, with “a whole series of fundamental and exploratory studies” and R&D projects initiated.118 Between 1967 and 1968, the laboratory developed the Palm countermeasure system for the UR-100-series missiles; Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (now KB Pivdenne) developed its own system, Leaf, for its R-36-series ICBM. By 1972, TsNII-108 Sector 3, the organization responsible for countermeasures development, was reorganized as Section 1, then in 1987 to STC-4. That same year, The RT-2P ICBM entered service with a TsNIRTI-developed Birch countermeasure system, and in 1974, the R-29 SLBM entered system with TsNIRTI’s Icebreaker countermeasures payload. Unlike Willow, Cactus, and Mole, these project codenames appear to correspond with entire countermeasures packages, including systems of multiple types, paired with specific weapon systems. Subsequent programs reportedly focused on low-observable warhead coatings, heavy decoys, and miniaturized active jammers.119


Other systems developed through 1970 by Russian design bureaus include Chestnut, Cypress, Magnolia, Laurel, and Elm, with many developments reportedly occurring between 1974 and 1986.120121 Without disclosing specifics on each system, TsNIRTI noted that by the mid-1970s the laboratory had developed 30-35kg-class “frequency-unified small active jammers [and] imitation (repeater) small active jammers” to fit on a variety of ballistic missiles.


Indeed, the 1980s apparently catalyzed “a new cycle of research and development work” within TsNIRTI, resulting in follow-on strategic systems including Magnolia-3, Bark, and Elm-2.122 Key to this effort was work to replicate the characteristics of U.S. missile defense systems, with new radars and other facilities constructed to flight test penetration aids.123


The pace of later developments is more difficult to track. The USSR apparently flight tested a jammer and a “space division station”, Bamboo and Bee, some time in the 1980s. Early developments for the Istra-4 penetration aids package, designed for the Topol-M missile, also began sometime in the 1980s. By the 1990s and 2000s, TsNIRTI began developing penetration aids for shorter-range ballistic missiles, conducting seven separate projects, along with one (System-200K) aimed at penetration aids for cruise missiles.


Only three countermeasures are publicly known to possess an operational GRAU designation: two endoatmospheric decoys and one of an unspecified type.124 Russian sources note that today’s missiles are thought to incorporate radar absorbent coatings, “hull metallization”, multi-layer thermal camouflages, light and heavy decoys, “inflatable masking deflectors,” dipole reflectors (chaff), and a variety of active jammers. The R-36M, R-36M2, Sineva, Bulava, UR-series, Molodets, Topol, Iskander, and Iskander-M missiles are thought to be fitted with penetration aids.

Table 2. Selected Soviet/Russian Countermeasure Programs125

NameDateNotes
Willow1958-63Decoy/chaff system. Flight tested at Sary Shagan, 1961
Cactus1958-63Radar-reducing coating or deployable system. Flight tested at Sary Shagan, 1961
Mole1958-63Electronic jammer. flight tested at Sary Shagan, 1961. Failure.
Mole-11961-“Continuous noise jammer” and “pulse response noise jammer” V.M. Gerasimenko led design
Palm1967-1968UR-series missile countermeasure package
LeafR-36 missile countermeasure package; developed cooperatively by Pyotr Pleshakov and Nikolai Ponomarev; serial production at Yuzhmash
Birch1972RT-2P missile countermeasure package
Icebreaker1974R-29 missile countermeasure package
Laurel1974-1986
Cypress1970s
Chestnut1970s
Elm1974-1986Identified in V.M Gerasimenko biography
Magnolia1974-1986Identified in V.M Gerasimenko biography
Magnolia-31980sIdentified in V.M Gerasimenko biography
Bark1980sIdentified in V.M Gerasimenko biography
Elm-21980s“Cluster” package for R-36M. Identified in V.M Gerasimenko biography
Bamboo1980sJammer
Bee1980s“Space division station”
CounteractionResearch project or study title. Identified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
Birch BarkIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
Set-MOIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
Set-2MOIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
CollectionIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
Istra-4Penetration package for Topol-M missile. Identified in Yu. A. Spirodonov biography
Magnolia-4Penetration package for Topol-M missile. Identified in Yu. A. Spirodonov biography
BodyguardIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
StuffIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
AccompanimentIdentified in N.G. Ponomarev biography
OkaIdentified in I. K. Kupriyanov biography
VolgaIdentified in I. K. Kupriyanov biography
LureIdentified in V.I. Kichin biography
System-200Research project title. identified in Yu. Spirodonov and V.M. Afonin biography
System-200KIdentified in V.P. Soldatov, A.P. Timchenko biography
Protection1970~1980“Spacecraft defense system” [защиты космических аппаратов (КА)]
Mirage1970~1980
Cab1970~1980
“Spacecraft space center protection”Identified in A.A. Aleksashenko biography
“Creation of CLC”Identified in T.N. Kadyrov biography
Sphere-TsIdentified in S.N. Druzhko biography

Preliminary Conclusions

What might these accounts suggest for strategic nuclear aspirants, including Iran and North Korea? The emergence of more detailed accounts and sources of countermeasure information reveals more potential barriers these actors might face. Simple chaff is not so simple, for instance—“in fact involv[ing] complex practical difficulties, such as ejection of long wires [in space]”—that took considerable resources to resolve.126 Even as late as 1987, the manufacturing of chaff faced major challenges, with “the cost of chaff…estimated to be $200M for a particular system.”127 Indeed, the challenge of reliably deploying chaff was so complex that it led to the development of maneuverable warhead buses, and eventually, to MIRV.128 Understanding the reentry phenomenology of these systems was, in the Department of Defense’s words, “difficult, time consuming, and expensive”—not, as often asserted, a “technically simple” task.129

Setting aside the production of countermeasures themselves, historical evidence suggests that their performance is contingent on obtaining effective means to validate them. That process of validation, however, can be costly. Developing chaff countermeasures, for instance, “took [the United States] almost a decade and required elaborate testing with sophisticated and expensive radar measurement systems,” in one account.130 ABRES was hungry for flight tests. By 1964, it was reported that a “sizeable portion” of ABRES’ budget was spent on test rockets and their associated range fees—with each test costing as much as “$100 million each” by 1991.131


The cost of measurement and rangekeeping developments also remains uncounted in many accounts. Millions were spent developing and modernizing radars on Kwajalein Atoll meant to replicate Soviet BMD capabilities.132 As remembered by Stanley Orman, chief engineer of Britain’s Chevaline system, countermeasure development occurred in concert with U.S. missile defense developments, and demanded significant knowledge “of Soviet defenses, how they worked, and their weak spots” to reach confidence.133 In DARPA histories, both BMD development and missile defense penetration technologies were described as “two sides of the same coin”—with each development base requiring data from the other to function.134 Aspirants seeking to develop high-confidence countermeasures may need to, as the United States and others did, obtain similar capabilities to U.S. ballistic missile defense.

Validation was critical because mistakes were costly. The Navy’s initial penetration aid system for the Polaris missile, which took nearly three years to deliver, “could not counter Galosh [Soviet ABM system] because jammers and chaff were cut to the wrong frequencies, decoys were too small to be seen by Galosh’s low-frequency radars, and MRVs [multiple reentry vehicles] were spaced improperly to accommodate the blast effects from Galosh’s big warheads.”135 In other words, the true cost of countermeasures is the cost of realistically validating their performance.136 States desiring high-confidence penetration are likely to reach the same conclusions the Air Force did in 1969—that “an all-RV attack, with no pen aids, is the least risky approach against a sophisticated area and terminal defense system.”137

All these underscore the deep uncertainties leaders faced in making decisions about countermeasure acquisition. To U.S. decisionmakers, the obsolescence of countermeasures would be difficult to determine “short of fighting a war.”138 Given these challenges, the development of decoys, chaff, and other penetration means were made adjunct to MIRV and other, higher-confidence means of assuring retaliation. Indeed, in making assessments, force planners routinely expressed countermeasures performance in probabilistic terms, and lacked sufficient confidence in their performance to reduce force levels on that basis.139 As the National Academies concluded in 2012, “It would be difficult for an adversary to have confidence in countermeasures without extensive testing, which the United States might be able to observe and on which it might gather data that would permit defeating the countermeasures.”140 While a countermeasure can take years to design and verify, a change making them obsolete—such as an update to target-discrimination software—might be deployed more quickly, and without a user’s knowledge. It is a cat-and-mouse game, but against an invisible cat.


No doubt, sophisticated countermeasures can pose a challenge for ballistic missile defense, and this promise motivated the decadal investments both the United States and Soviet Union made in these technologies. But at their end, U.S. countermeasure programs were deemed “mixed success[es]”, beset with cost and schedule overruns.141 They were adjuncts to other penetration approaches, and necessitated advanced intelligence capabilities and mature domestic BMD programs to test against.142 These hurdles are unlikely to change for aspiring missile powers. Much like the countermeasures debate itself, the story of countermeasures is ultimately a tale of how much uncertainty one can tolerate.


The author would like to make special acknowledgement to Kasey Welch for her tireless assistance in editing and proofreading this work.

Appendix

Table 3. Relevant figures, Russian countermeasures establishment143

InstitutionTitleDateNameMisc
TsNII-108 Mid-50s – 1958V.S. ShkolnikovEarly feasibility study
TsNII-108Head of lab1958A.B. DanilovWorked on Cactus
TsNII-108Head of Mole-1 project1961V.M. Gerasimenko 
OKB-1 of NII-88Father of Soviet space program, first ICBM designer1950s-60s?S.P. Korolev 
OKB-1 (now Energia)Father of Soviet ABM system1950s-60s?G.V. Kisunko 
OKB-52 (now NPOMash)Father of UR-100 series rockets1950s-60s?Vladimir ChelomeySupportive of countermeasures; visited TsNII-108 offices in Moscow and Reutov
OKB-586Yuzhnoye headDuring 1950s – 1972M.K. Yangel 
TsNII-108Head of Sector 31959M.A. KolosovLater deputy director for science in the Institute for Radio-Engineering and Electronics
TsNII-108Head of Sector 31959-1961A.V. TarantsovIntegrator of countermeasures into ballistic missile systems
TsNII-108Head of Sector 31961-1962V.S. ShkolnikovBriefly headed sector
TsNII-108Head of Sector 31962-1965N.N. AlexeevHeaded sector
TsNII-108Head of Sector 3. Renamed Section 1 in 1972.1965-1972V.M. GerasimenkoBrought development “to a new level.” Chief designer, Cypress, Laurel, Elm, Magnolia, Magnolia-3, Bark, Elm-2.
TsNII-108Head of STC-4, the new name for Section 1.1987Yu. A. Spirodonov 
TsNII-108Director of TsNII-1081968 – 1985Yu. N. Mazharov 
USSR Minister of Radio Industry  P.S. PleshakovParticipant in countermeasure development and later head of USSR radio industry

Image 2. Russian “Dielectric antenna” decoy (left) and atmospheric heavy decoy (right)144

Image 3. Russian decoy and container145

Image 4. Russian cassette for two inflatable reflectors146

Image 5. Russian inflatable reflectors and dispenser147

Image 6. Cutaway of U.S. AMaRV maneuvering reentry vehicle148

Image 7. Russian chaff dispensing system149

Image 8. Russian chaff dispensing system150

Image 9. Russian inflatable masking balloon system151

Image 10. Russian freon-powered chaff ejector152

Image 11. Russian jammer antenna feeder153

Image 12. Russian millimeter-wave RF output generator154

Image 13. Russian lightweight reflector155

Image 14. Russian electronic countermeasure156

Footnotes

    1. Annie Jacobsen, Nuclear War: A Scenario (New York: Dutton, 2024); Laura Grego, George Lewis, and David Wright, Shielded from Oversight: The Disastrous US Approach to Strategic Missile Defense (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2016), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/07/Shielded-from-Oversight-full-report.pdf; George Lewis and Frank von Hippel, “Improving U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Policy,” Arms Control Today (May 2018), 16 – 22.
    2. Jaganath Sankaran and Steve Fetter, “Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea,” International Security 46, No. 3 (Winter 2021/22), 51 – 86.
    3. Jen Judson, “How Patriot proved itself in Ukraine and secured a fresh future,” Defense News, April 9, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/04/09/how-patriot-proved-itself-in-ukraine-and-secured-a-fresh-future/; Moshe Patel and Tom Karako, “Israel’s Missile Defense Engagements Since October 7th,” (presentation, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 12, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/israels-missile-defense-engagements-october-7th.
    4. Andrew Sessler et al., Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2000)
    5. John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, “Britain and the Chevaline Project: The Hidden Nuclear Programme, 1967-82,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, (2003), pp. 124-155, DOI: 10.1080/0141-2390312331279718; Helen Parr, “The British Decision to Upgrade Polaris, 1970-4,” Contemporary European History, No. 22, Vol. 2 (2013), pp. 253-274.
    6. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 3: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951p01165357y.
    7. National Research Council, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2012), 102.
    8. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl.b5107637.
    9. MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in Support of National Security (Lexington, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011), https://www.ll.mit.edu/sites/default/files/other/doc/2018-04/MIT_Lincoln_Laboratory_history_book.pdf.  Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b5107637.
    10. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b5107637.
    11. See also: A. Yu Nikolaev, D.S. Panin, Yury S. Solomonov, Fundamentals of designing solid-fuel guided ballistic missiles, Part II (Moscow: Bauman Moscow State Technical University Press, 2000), pp. 61 – 63, https://www.studmed.ru/nikolaev-yum-panin-sd-solomonov-yus-osnovy-proektirovaniya-tverdotoplivnyh-upravlyaemyh-ballisticheskih-raket-chast-2_5d53e692fce.html.
    12. Tony C. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 40, No. 4 (2003), 491–509, https://doi.org/10.2514/2.3990.
    13. Barry Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 20, 1964.
    14. Richard H. Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II: A Historical Review of Selected DARPA Projects (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1991), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA241725.pdf.
    15. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths,http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b5107637.
    16. Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening.”
    17. Bernard C. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1964–1966, 80-CVAH(S)-D233 (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb249/doc04.pdf.
    18. John T. Greenwood, Space and Missile Systems Organization: A Chronology, 1954-1979 (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 1979) https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA369676.pdf.
    19. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.” Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1988/89 Budget Estimates: Descriptive Summaries, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1987), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADB109541.pdf.
    20. Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening.”
    21. Jacob Neufeld, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1969-1970 (Office of Air Force History, 1971), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb249/doc06.pdf.
    22. Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening.”
    23. Owen Wilkes, Megan Van Frank, and Peter Hayes, Chasing Gravity’s Rainbow: Kwajalein and US Ballistic Missile Testing (Canberra: Australian National University, 1991), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uva.x002060956.
    24. Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening.”
    25. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.” Not flown, but a homing, lightweight MaRV.
    26. Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    27. Greenwood, Space and Missile Systems Organization
    28. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Director of Guided Missiles, Progress of ICBM and IRBM Programs, Report No. 37, (Washington: Department of Defense, December 31, 1958).
    29. Bernard C. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964, 80-CVAH(S) D-236, (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, April 1966).
    30. Glenn W. Meurer, “The TRADEX Multitarget Tracker” The Lincoln Laboratory Journal 6, No. 3 (1992), 317 – 350, https://archive.ll.mit.edu/publications/journal/pdf/vol05_no3/5.3.1.tradextracker.pdf.
    31. William Z. Lemnios and Alan A. Grometstein, “Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program,” Lincoln Laboratory Journal 13, no. 1 (2002): 9–32.
    32. MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in Support of National Security.
    33. Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    34. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964.
    35. Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner and Thomas W. Wolfe, History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945 – 1972, Part II (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1981).
    36. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964.
    37. Walter S. Poole, History of Acquisition in The Department of Defense Volume II: Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960–1968 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2013), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/acquisition_pub/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol2.pdf.
    38. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964.
    39. Ibid.
    40. Greenwood, Space and Missile Systems Organization; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Analysis of Arms Control Impact Statements Submitted in Connection with the Fiscal Year 1978 Budget Request, 95th Cong., 1st sess. (1977), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp/39015077914813; Lemnios and Grometstein, “Overview of the Lincoln Laboratory Ballistic Missile Defense Program”; Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    41. W.S. Kennedy et al., “Solid Rocket Motor Development for Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets Vol. 36, No. 6 (1999), pp. 890-901.
    42. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964., Bernard C. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1965, 80-CVAH(S)-D233 (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, March 1967); Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems,” ; Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    43. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 18456, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2nd sess (1966), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015035789216.
    44. Bernard C. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967–1968, 80-CVAH(s)-D214 (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 1969), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb249/doc05.pdf.
    45. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967–1968.; Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 5, 89th Cong., 2nd  sess., (1966), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31210019439296; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 4, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, 91st Cong., 1st sess., (1969), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.35112202783553.
    46. Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening.”
    47. Ibid.
    48. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1962-1964; Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening.”
    49. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1964–1966.
    50. Ibid.
    51. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 3: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951p01165357y; Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967–1968.
    52. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967–1968.
    53. Ibid.
    54. Richard A. Hartunian, “Ballistic Missile and Reentry Systems: The Critical Years,” Crosslink (Aerospace Corporation) (Winter 2003), https://web.archive.org/web/20030410002921/http://aero.org/publications/crosslink/winter2003/02.html.
    55. Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (New York: Bloomsbury, 1988), ISBN: 9780819170774.
    56. Ibid.
    57. Poole, History of Acquisition in The Department of Defense Volume II: Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960–1968.; Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    58. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967–1968.
    59. Neufeld, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1969-1970.
    60. Nalty, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1967–1968.; Neufeld, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1969-1970.
    61. Neufeld, USAF Ballistic Missile Programs 1969-1970.
    62. MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in Support of National Security.
    63. Hartunian, “Ballistic Missile and Reentry Systems: The Critical Years”; U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 91st Congress. 2nd sess. (1970), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl.b3636897; Barry Miller, “Advanced Reentry Vehicle Tests Planned,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 24, 1976; U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Part 2, Amendments to the Budget Reprogrammings, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., (1972), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31210017812726.
    64. Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl.b3636897.
    65. U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973, Part 4, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (1972), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.31210017813427.
    66. U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1973, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (1972), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4292091.
    67. Ibid.
    68. Matthew Bunn, “Technology of Ballistic Missile Reentry Vehicles,” in Review of U.S. Military Research and Development, ed. Kosta Tsipis and Penny Janeway (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984), ISBN: 0-08-031622-0; U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015076083875; U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1980: Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st sess (1979), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b4292500.
    69. U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (1976), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015074749386; Senate Armed Services Committee, Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b5107637.
    70. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research, and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess. (1974). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015076087181.
    71. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1977: Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (1976), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl.aa0002335370.
    72. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1976 and July-September 1976 Transition Period Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (1975), https://documentcloud.adobe.com/spodintegration/index.html.
    73. U.S. Air Force, History Support Office, “Space and Missile Systems Organization: A Chronology, 1954-1979,” by John T. Greenwood, October 1979,  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA369676.pdf.
    74. Miller, “Advanced Reentry Vehicle Tests Planned”; House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1977,http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl.aa0002335370; U.S. Congress, House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1977 94th Cong., 2nd sess. (1976), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.aa0002335370.
    75. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 95th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1978), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d034402778.
    76. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1980: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/ucl.b4292502.
    77. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979,  http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d034402778.
    78. Greenwood, Space and Missile Systems Organization.
    79. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1984 Budget Estimates: Descriptive Summaries, Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1983), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA125932.pdf.
    80. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.”.; 1983-cong-53
    81. Hartunian, “Ballistic Missile and Reentry Systems: The Critical Years”; Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems”; U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (1980), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d03524652t.
    82. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.”
    83. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1984 Budget Estimates.
    84. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1988/89 Budget Estimates: Descriptive Summaries, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1987), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADB109541.pdf
    85. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.”
    86. U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1987 Arms Control Impact Statements, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. (1986), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433107589776.
    87. Wilkes et al., Chasing Gravity’s Rainbow, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uva.x002060956.
    88. Lin, “Development of U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon Systems.”
    89. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1988/89 Budget Estimates.
    90. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1990/91: Descriptive Summaries, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1989), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA208565.pdf.
    91. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1988/89 Budget Estimates.
    92. Supporting Data for FY1991 Budget Estimates.
    93. Ibid.
    94. MGM-118A Peacekeeper – Archived 1/98 (Sandy Hook, CT: Forecast International, 1997), https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_old_pdf.cfm?ARC_ID=1089.
    95. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1993 Budget Estimates: Descriptive Summaries, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1992), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA249654.pdf.
    96. Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1999 Amended Budget Estimates: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Descriptive Summaries (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1998), https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY99/AFD-070223-247.pdf?ver=2016-08-10-132408-947; Fiscal Year 2000/2001 Biennial Budget Estimates: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Descriptive Summaries (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 1999), https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY00/AFD-070223-220.pdf?ver=2016-08-10-143046-310.
    97. Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates: Research Development, Test and Evaluation, Descriptive Summaries, Volume I, Budget Activities 1-3 (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2008), https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY09/AFD-080130-059.pdf?ver=2016-08-22-141512-193.
    98. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years], (Chekhov, Russia: АО «Первая Образцовая типография» филиал «Чеховский Печатный Двор» [JSC First Model Printing House, br. Chekhov Printing Yard], 2018), pp. 138 – 147.
    99. Spassky et al., Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 9: Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, (Moscow: Publishing House ‘Arms and Technologies,’ 2004). pp. 662, 663, 701.
    100. Pervov, Mikhail, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces], (Moscow: JSC Publishing House “News,” 1999, ISBN: 5-88149-041-X, https://www.worldcat.org/title/44908652?oclcNum=44908652.
    101. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].
    102. Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    103. V. C. Belous, Missile Defense and Weapons of the XXI Century (2002), (Moscow: Veche, 2002), ISBN: 5-94538-017-2, p. 209.
    104. Ibid.
    105. Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    106. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years]; G.V. Kisunko, Секретная зона: исповедь генерального конструктора [The Secret Zone: Confessions of The General Designer] (Moscow, Sovremennik, 1996), ISBN: 9785270018795.
    107. Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    108. Ibid.
    109. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years]; Belous, Missile Defense and Weapons of the XXI Century, 209;Kisunko, Секретная зона: исповедь генерального конструктора [The Secret Zone: Confessions of The General Designer].
    110. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].
    111. Kisunko, Секретная зона: исповедь генерального конструктора [The Secret Zone: Confessions of The General Designer].
    112. Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    113. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].
    114. Victor Gobarev, “The early development of Russia’s ballistic missile defense system,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 14 (2001), 29 – 48, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13518040108430478.
    115. Belous, Missile Defense and Weapons of the XXI Century (2002).
    116. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].
    117. Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    118. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].
    119. Alexey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “The Impact of MIRVs and Counterforce Targeting on the US-Soviet Strategic Relationship,” in The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age, ed. By Michael Krepon et al., (Washington: Stimson Center, 2016), <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Lure_and_Pitfalls_of_MIRVs.pdf> p. 62.
    120. Sergeev et al., Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 13: Control, Communication, and Radio Electronic Warfare Systems, (Moscow: Publishing House ‘Arms and Technologies,’ 2004). pp. 594 – 596.
    121. ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].
    122. Ibid.
    123. Ibid.
    124. Головные части и боевые блоки ракетных комплексов РВСН [Warheads and warheads of the Strategic Missile Forces Missile Systems], Military Russia, June 6, 2025, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-869.html
    125. ЦНИРТИ: 65 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 65 Years], (Moscow, Russia: ОАО «Московская типография Nº 6». [JSC Moscow Printing House No. 6], 2008); Yu Nikolaev, D.S. Panin, Yury S. Solomonov, Fundamentals of designing solid-fuel guided ballistic missiles, Part II (Moscow: Bauman Moscow State Technical University Press, 2000), pp. 61 – 63, https://www.studmed.ru/nikolaev-yum-panin-sd-solomonov-yus-osnovy-proektirovaniya-tverdotoplivnyh-upravlyaemyh-ballisticheskih-raket-chast-2_5d53e692fce.html; ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years]; Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    126. Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    127. Mantech Project Book (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: United States Air Force, 1992), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA245283.pdf.
    128. Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making.
    129. U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, On H.R. 15090, an act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (1969), pp. 371-376, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3636870>;  Andrew Sessler et al., Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2000).
    130. Jerry Friedheim to Larry Lynn, “Questions and answers relating to the U.S. military budget for weapons systems needed to protect the U.S. from possible Soviet aggression,” Memorandum, n.d.,, http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6hadg4, q. 7.
    131. Van Atta et al., “Darpa Technical Accomplishments Volume II,” p. 1-26; Miller, “Studies of Penetration Aids Broadening,”, pp. 72, 73.
    132. Winfred E. Berg to E. C. Welsh, “Soviet One-Orbit Space Operations,” Memorandum, October 17, 1967, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6hcaP3>; U.S. Army, Strategic Defense Command, “Final Report of the USAKA Long Range Planning Study” by R.E. Sampson, Report No. 214102-14-T, October 1989, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a219642.pdf>.
    133. Personal interview, 2023.
    134. Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II.
    135. Poole, History of Acquisition in The Department of Defense Volume II: Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960–1968.
    136. MIT Lincoln Laboratory: Technology in Support of National Security.
    137. U.S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, On H.R. 15090, an act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, and for other purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (1969), pp. 371-376, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3636870>.
    138. U.S. Department of Defense, “Discussion of U.S. Intelligence Needs on Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),” FOIA No. CIA-RDP80B01138A000100070013-3, n.d., <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01138A000100070013-3.pdf>.
    139. Ibid.
    140. National Research Council, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense.
    141. Ibid.
    142. Van Atta et al., DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II, 1-13.
    143. ЦНИРТИ: 65 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 65 Years]. Yu Nikolaev, D.S. Panin, Yury S. Solomonov, Fundamentals of designing solid-fuel guided ballistic missiles, Part II (Moscow: Bauman Moscow State Technical University Press, 2000), pp. 61 – 63, https://www.studmed.ru/nikolaev-yum-panin-sd-solomonov-yus-osnovy-proektirovaniya-tverdotoplivnyh-upravlyaemyh-ballisticheskih-raket-chast-2_5d53e692fce.html; ЦНИРТИ: 75 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 75 Years].; Pervov, Ракетные Комплексы Ракетных Войск Стратегческого Назначения [Strategic Missile Systems of the Strategic Rocket Forces].
    144. ЦНИРТИ: 65 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 65 Years].
    145. Spassky et al., Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 5: Space Weapons, (Moscow: Publishing House ‘Arms and Technologies,’ 2002)
    146. ЦНИРТИ: 65 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 65 Years].
    147. Spassky et al., Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 5: Space Weapons.
    148. U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 10929 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951d00816459m.
    149. ЦНИРТИ: 65 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 65 Years].
    150. Spassky et al., Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 5: Space Weapons.
    151. ЦНИРТИ: 65 ЛЕТ [CNIRTI: 65 Years].
    152. Ibid.
    153. Ibid.
    154. Ibid.
    155. Ibid.
    156. Spassky et al., Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia, Volume 5: Space Weapons.
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Masao Dahlgren is a fellow with the CSIS Missile Defense Project, where he focuses on deterrence and emerging technologies.

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Masao Dahlgren, "Countermeasures, Penetration Aids, and Missile Defense," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 17, 2025, last modified October 17, 2025, https://missilethreat.csis.org/countermeasures-penetration-aids-and-missile-defense/.

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Countermeasures, Penetration Aids, and Missile Defense

October 17, 2025

In discussions on missile defense, the matter of countermeasures—decoy warheads and other deceptive missile payloads—is often invoked but insufficiently explored. For decades, popular commentators assumed that adversaries could readily develop countermeasures capable of defeating U.S. missile defense systems. With Russia and China having deployed missile defense countermeasures in their nuclear arsenals, it was assumed that...