The proliferation of missile threats has made air and missile defense interceptors the table stakes for entry into future conflicts, forcing the Department of Defense to either ante up and buy the necessary interceptors, or fold on its regional interests and bear the consequences.
The Trump administration’s Golden Dome initiative is both strategically necessary and long overdue. It is also already in jeopardy of failure. The reason? A lack of dialogue and persuasion. If the Pentagon does not start explaining Golden Dome, it will never be built.
Nuclear-powered cruise missiles are not a new idea—they’re just a bad idea. While Russia’s Burevestnik missile is grabbing headlines, it does not fundamentally change Russia’s ability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk or the strategic balance between the two states.
Today’s global threat landscape is accompanied by the advent of a new missile age, one defined by a surge in the global supply and demand for a broad and diverse spectrum of strike capabilities as well as the means to counter them.
New guidance for implementing the Missile Technology Control Regime will make it moderately easier for the United States to sell UASs to allies. But more fundamental reform is still needed to adapt the nonproliferation regime to today’s strategic environment.
Artillery has long been known as the “king of battle,” and for good reason. The future of warfare will likely be characterized by an increased demand signal for offensive and defensive fires.
Recent Department of Defense (DOD) budgets have seen lower Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor procurement numbers, triggering renewed concerns about missile defense interceptor inventories.
Missile defense modernization depends on more than hardware. Civilian weather agencies like NOAA and NASA play a quiet but critical role.
Auctioning the low-3 S-band spectrum for commercial 5G use poses serious national security risks, potentially interfering with military radar and missile defense systems. Given escalating air and missile threats, the U.S. should maintain exclusive military access to this spectrum while continuing to study long-term sharing options.
The most ambitious visions of the Golden Dome missile defense architecture face tough budgetary decisions about their prioritization within the missile defense portfolio, in the Department of Defense capability mix, and across the federal budget.
