Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense


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The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System, is the sea-based component of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). It uses the SPY-1 radar and variants of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) or Standard Missile-6 to intercept ballistic missiles during midcourse or terminal phases of flight. The system is integrated on certain U.S. Navy Ticonderoga-class Cruisers (CG) and Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG). The land-based variant, known as Aegis Ashore, is currently deployed in Deveselu, Romania as part of the NATO missile defense system.

Aegis BMD is a component of the Aegis Combat System, an integrated naval weapon system that provides air and fleet defense against enemy aircraft and cruise missiles using variations of the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and the Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM), and ship defense systems such as the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS). It also controls the firing of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles.

aegis bmd

Deployments

As of 2021, there are 90 U.S. Navy surface combatants equipped with the Aegis Combat System: 22 Ticonderoga-class Guided Missile Cruisers (CG) and 68 Arleigh Burke-class Guided Missile Destroyers (DDG). Forty-seven of these ships are Aegis BMD-capable (42 DDG and 5 CG). The Navy projects that the number of Aegis BMD ships will increase to 65 by FY2025.1

The land-based Aegis Ashore is currently deployed in Deveselu, Romania, with another site under construction in Redzikowa, Poland. The Romania site currently deploys SM-3 IB interceptors, and the Poland site is expected to employ the newer SM-3 IIA. There is another Aegis Ashore facility is located at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, which serves as the system’s test bed. On April 26, 2017, U.S. PACOM commander ADM Harry Harris recommended to Congress that the U.S. operationalize the Aegis Ashore test facility in Hawaii to bolster the state’s defenses against a potential North Korean missile attack.2

Aegis BMD Components

Aegis BMD is made up of three basic components: sensors, interceptors, and command and control. The primary ballistic missile defense interceptor is the Standard Missile-3, of which there have been three-block developments (SM-3 IA, IB, and IIA), with each block having increased range and overall capability from the previous. SM-3 uses hit to kill technology to destroy incoming missile warheads during midcourse in the exoatmosphere. Aegis BMD also employs other atmospheric interceptors, including the SM-2 Block IV and SM-6 for terminal ballistic missile defense. These interceptors are fired from the Mark 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS).

The primary sensor for Aegis BMD is the AN/SPY-1D, an S-band radar with near 360-degree coverage. Many new Aegis platforms are incorporating new more advanced sensors like the SPY-6 and SPY-7 radars. Modernized Aegis BMD platforms can also launch SM-3 interceptors using data from remote sensors, such as the TPY-2 X-band radar.

Onboard command and control is governed by the Aegis Combat System, which has been gradually improved through a series of hardware and software upgrades called “baselines.” The most recent version, Baseline 9, allows for a single ship to conduct both ballistic missile defense and air defense operations simultaneously. Prior baselines permitted only one of these missions at a time, usually requiring Aegis ships to operate in pairs.

On a strategic level, Aegis ships and Aegis Ashore sites are integrated into the broader BMDS through the Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) system. This linkage allows for Aegis ships and sites to be alerted to missile threats detected by other BMDS sensors, and to transmit its own sensor data to the BMDS, including providing sensor data to support the U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system.

Aegis BMD Development

Efforts to add a BMD capability to Aegis ships have roots in a 1991 Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)-issued Mission Needs Statement which articulated a requirement for greater protection of overseas U.S. forces against theater-level ballistic missile threats.3.

Aegis Weapon System Programmatic Evolution
Aegis Weapon System Programmatic Evolution. Image: CSIS

In 1993, the Pentagon reorganized the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to form the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Unlike the ambitious goals of the SDIO, the BMDO had a more limited focus on developing theater-level ballistic missile defenses. BMDO pursued four main programs throughout the 1990s, two land-based and two sea-based. The sea-based elements included the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program, an upper-tier system to intercept ballistic in the exoatmosphere during midcourse. The other sea-based element was the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NATBMD), meant to engage ballistic missiles within the atmosphere during a missile’s terminal phase. Congress approved funding for these programs in 1994.

Given the similarities between sea-based air defense and sea-based BMD, the Aegis Weapon System was a logical candidate for the BMDO to build upon for the sea-based leg. Like air defense, ballistic missile defense also requires rapid command and control operations, a key feature of the Aegis Combat System. The Aegis Weapon System had not been designed with the BMD mission in mind, however. Several modifications were required to meet the performance requirements, including a longer instrumented range for the radar and more sensitive waveforms for search and tracking ballistic targets. Improved radar processing and upgraded command and control systems would be required to identify and discriminate ballistic missiles, and new interceptors would need to be developed. Although short-lived, the NATBMD and NTW programs accomplished much to overcome these obstacles.

Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NATBMD): 1991-2001

Known prior to 1994 as the Navy Lower Tier, the program of record for the terminal defense layer of sea-based BMD architecture was the Navy Area Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (NATBMD) in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). The mission of NATBMD was to provide point defense against short- to medium-range ballistic missiles to protect military forces, installations, and landing areas. This challenge was similar in many respects to that of the Patriot air and missile defense system, except that NATBMD was based at sea. As with existing Aegis air defense missions, NATBMD would engage targets within the atmosphere, so a new interceptor was not required. Instead, the already-in-service SM-2 Block IV was modified to handle ballistic missiles.

The modified interceptor was known during its development as SM-2 Block IVA and was equipped with a side-mounted infrared seeker, a faster autopilot, and a forward-looking fuze that would detonate the interceptor at the optimal moment to shower an incoming warhead with fragments. In 1997, an SM-2 Blk IVA completed a successful intercept test, destroying a Lance ballistic missile over the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. Nonetheless, the NATBMD was canceled in 2001, around the time of the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and just prior to re-chartering BMDO as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

Sea-based Terminal

Despite the NATBMD’s cancellation, the Navy maintained its desire for a sea-based terminal BMD capability. The Missile Defense Agency has continued to test “modified” SM-2 Block IVs against ballistic missile targets under the auspices of Aegis BMD. The first such tests took place in 2006, when an SM-2 Blk IV destroyed an SRBM target in its terminal phase. This first test employed a prototype sea-based BMD C2 system called “Linebacker.” Later tests and deployments would use the Aegis BMD system. Also in 2006, China introduced a new ballistic missile variant, the DF-21D, which purportedly has antiship capabilities. In 2013, China tested this missile against aircraft carrier-shaped targets in the Gobi desert.

Modified SM-2 Block IVs performed successfully in three more terminal ballistic missile intercept tests, most recently in July 2015. During this period, these interceptors became, in effect, an interim sea-based terminal capability until a new interceptor could be developed. MDA and the Navy would modify 75 out of the Navy’s inventory of 100 SM-2 Block IVs to be sea-based terminal-capable. The SM-2 Block IV is being phased out in favor of the Standard Missile-6.

Navy Theater Wide: (1994-2001)

In 1994, BMDO and the Navy began the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program to provide upper-tier BMD protection over a large area, including over land. Unlike NATBMD, NTW would engage targets outside of the atmosphere during midcourse. This required the development of a new interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). Building on the first two stages of the SM-2 Block IV, SM-3 would also include a third-stage rocket motor (TSRM) and a “fourth stage” hit-to-kill kinetic warhead that would maneuver itself into the path of an incoming warhead. In contrast to the SM-2 Block IVA which used proximity blast fragmentation warhead, the SM-3 would destroy its targets with kinetic energy alone using a separating “kill vehicle” that would deploy after interceptor burnout. The Aegis Combat System would also need significant hardware additions and new software to allow it to discriminate objects in space, specifically to determine warheads from debris.

The sea-based BMD development effort saw several important milestones between 1999 and 2002, when the NTW program picked up Terrier LEAP and embarked on the Aegis Leap Intercept (ALI) Flight Demonstration Project. The goals of ALI were to demonstrate the basic technical ability to kinetically kill a theater-range ballistic missile in midcourse.

In 1994, BMDO and the Navy began the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) program to provide upper-tier BMD protection over large areas, including over land. Unlike NATBMD, NTW would engage targets outside of the atmosphere during midcourse. This required the development of a new interceptor, the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). Building on the first two stages of the SM-2 Block IV, SM-3 would also include a third-stage rocket motor (TSRM) and a “fourth stage” hit-to-kill kinetic warhead that would maneuver itself into the path of an incoming warhead. In contrast to the SM-2 Block IVA which used proximity blast fragmentation warhead, the SM-3 would destroy its targets with kinetic energy alone using a separating “kill vehicle” that would deploy after interceptor burnout. The Aegis Combat System would also need significant hardware additions and new software to allow it to discriminate objects in space, specifically to determine warheads from debris.   

The sea-based BMD development effort saw several important milestones between 1999 and 2002, when the NTW program picked up Terrier LEAP and embarked on the Aegis Leap Intercept (ALI) Flight Demonstration Project. The goals of ALI were to demonstrate the basic technical ability to kinetically kill a theater-range ballistic missile in midcourse.

Unlike its sister program Navy Area Defense, the Navy Theater Wide program was never officially canceled. Rather, it was renamed, transformed, and renamed again during the transition from Navy/BMDO stewardship to that of the Missile Defense Agency, and from the Clinton to Bush administrations. By mid-2001, the phrase “Navy Theater Wide” had largely fallen out of use, perhaps encouraged by Secretary Rumsfeld’s direction to no longer distinguish between “theater” and “national” missile defenses.

For a short time in 2001, NTW became known as Sea-based Midcourse, a subcomponent of the broader Midcourse Defense program that also included the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the successor to the Clinton-era National Missile Defense system. By 2002, however, the program assumed a new name: Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense.

Post-ABM Treaty Era

In 2001, the Bush Administration made major changes to U.S. missile defense policy and the BMD research and development effort writ large. Rather than a purely R&D effort within the bounds of the ABM Treaty like NTW and NATMBD programs, the new administration intended to “pursue a robust missile defense RDT&E [Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation] program to acquire the capabilities to deploy limited, but effective missile defenses as soon as possible to protect the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.” 6

Another significant move was the Administration reformation of the BMDO into the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in January 2002. The Pentagon granted MDA more flexible acquisition authorities to accelerate missile defense development, making it more responsive to threat developments. MDA fully absorbed the missions of both the NATBMD and NTW programs, and the former Navy NTW program office became the Aegis BMD directorate within MDA. In May 2002, MDA initiated a study on how best to continue pursuit of a sea-based terminal capability. Rather than a new program to replace NATBMD, MDA instead opted to create a “limited emergency capability” by modifying the fuzes on the Navy’s inventory of 100 extended range SM-2 Block IV interceptors.7

The work on NTW transitioned smoothly into MDA’s Sea-based Midcourse program. Budgeting priority, however, fell relatively low when compared to GMD, the successor to the Clinton-era National Missile Defense Program, at well under one-half the funding of GMD until 2008.

MDA nonetheless was able to conduct a series of SM-3 intercept tests between 2002-2005, gradually increasing in complexity, and tested out advancements such as a new Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS) for greater interceptor agility. The adjunct Aegis BMD command and control hardware and software to allow the AWS to engage ballistic missiles, was also in development. The existing ACS on the Navy’s cruisers and destroyers was insufficient for the enhanced performance BMD required. Tracking and discriminating space-breathing targets, for example, was more demanding on the ship’s radars, requiring greater range and higher waveforms. While the SPY-1 could stretch meet these demands, it required diverting resources away from the air search mission. The computer control programs required to engage ballistic missiles, furthermore, proved too great a strain on the ships’ AN/UYK-43-44 Military Specification (MILSPEC) computers, and was thus performed by adjunct commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computer hardware plugged into the ACS mainframe.8

The workaround resulted in a bifurcation between Aegis BMD and the Aegis Combat System that governed nearly everything else on the ship. Rather than following the regular Baseline System, upgrades to Aegis BMD have come in series of “versions.” The first of these was Aegis BMD 3.0E, which was only capable of providing Long-Range Surveillance and Tracking (LRS&T) for the BMDS. In September 2004, several LRS&T-capable ships had been deployed to the Pacific to support GMD’s initial operational capability. 

The first software version that permitted SM-3 engagement was Aegis BMD 3.0. In October 2004, the Navy had received 12 of the first deployable version of the Standard Missile-3s, the SM-3 Block I (only twelve of this model was ever built). In 2005, MDA and the Navy outfitted the first ship, the USS Lake Erie (CG-70), with Aegis BMD 3.0 with engagement capability. By 2008, this number would increase to 18 BMD engagement-capable ships—three cruisers and 15 destroyers.9

These first Aegis BMD deployments came with a major drawback. Because of the great performance demands of the BMD mission and its separation from the overall Aegis Combat System, as previously noted, ships performing BMD patrols —whether in the Sea of Japan, the Arabian Sea or elsewhere—could do little other than BMD. Strike and anti-submarine warfare missions could still be conducted with these weapon systems in “standalone” mode, but this decreased reaction time and other benefits of the ACS. Long-range air defense and ship self-defense missions were even more severely degraded when Aegis 3.0 system was online.10. Aegis ships could do the BMD mission, or they could do everything else, but could not do both at the same time.

The following Aegis BMD Version, 3.6, contained a multi-warfare upgrade that sought to shore up this weakness. It gave the ships a limited self-defense capability while conducting BMD operations. This upgrade was tested for the first time in April 2007, when USS Lake Erie successfully engaged a unitary short-range ballistic target and a simulated cruise missile with an SM-3 Block IA and an SM-2, respectively. The test was not particularly stressing on the system, but “demonstrated some level of capability for simultaneous ship self-defense and BMD functionality.”11 Until the advent of fully embedded BMD into the ACS with Baseline 9 (B/L 9), the Navy would not rely heavily on the multi-warfare upgrade.

A New Focus on Aegis BMD

In 2009, the newly elected Obama administration reexamined the U.S. missile defense policy guiding the development of the BMDS. One its most consequential decisions was to replace the proposed emplacements of 10 ground-based interceptors in Europe with a new plan it called the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). President Obama called for a European missile defense deployment that would be “phased and adaptive,” and one that would “deploy technologies that are proven and cost-effective and that counter the current threat and do so sooner than the previous program.”12

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates would later specify that the “proven and cost-effective” capabilities referenced by the President for Europe would be based on the Aegis BMD program General James Cartwright, then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added that:

What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than we what we have with a ground-based interceptor.  A single Aegis can carry a hundred-plus or minus a few, depending on their mission configuration, of the SM-3.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. James Cartwright, “DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Gen. Cartwright from the Pentagon,” news transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, September 17, 2009.

The Obama administration would further articulate the European Phased Adaptive Approach for NATO BMD in its 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The architecture, expressly created to counter a limited ballistic missile attack from the Middle East, would proceed in four phases. The centerpiece of each was based on the Aegis BMD System and a series of block developments to the SM-3 interceptor. All told, the completion of EPAA would require the development of:

  • Three new Standard Missile-3 variants
    • SM-3 IB – An improved version of the SM-3 IA, that featured a two-color seeker (as compared to the IA’s one-color seeker), and a throttleable divert attitude control system (TDACS).
    • SM-3 IIA – A major design turn on the SM-3, the IIA would feature a larger diameter KV with high divert DACS and increased operating time, a 21-inch propulsion stack for increased VBO.
    • SM-3 IIB – An even greater redesign, the SM-3 IIB would have the ability to intercept ICBM-class targets, requiring a substantially higher velocity, and other improvements.
  • A land-based version of the Aegis Weapon System (Aegis Ashore).
  • Upgraded BMD Software and C2: 
    • Aegis BMD 4.0.1 (for SM-3 IB)
    • Aegis BMD 5.1 (for SM-3 IIA, fully into ACS Baseline 9 COTS computers)
    • Baseline 9E (Variant for Aegis Ashore)
    • Upgraded C2BMC Spiral in incorporate Aegis Ashore into BMDS

Work on the SM-3 IB had been ongoing for several years prior to 2010 policy declaration, completing its critical design review in July of 2009 Serial production of the IB began in 2013, with an initial delivery of 16 SM-3 IBs to the fleet by the end of that year, and the interceptor was declared operationally deployed in 2014.13 In 2015, SM-3 IBs started receiving software upgrades to improve its performance against more complex threats. MDA designated these variants the SM-3 IB Threat Upgrade (SM-3 IB TU).

The SM-3 IIA development had likewise been ongoing since 2006, a cooperative effort between Japan and the United States. The SM-3was perhaps the biggest departure in Standard Missile airframe design since the inclusion of the third stage in the Terrier Leap flights of the early 1990s. To increase the velocity at burnout (VBO) to the greatest extent possible with existing fuels and propulsion, designers widened the SM-3’s main body by 7.5 inches to 21 inches across in total. This increased the amount propulsion that could be got while still able to fit inside the Mk 41 VLS tube. The kill vehicle was also larger, with more maneuverability, owed to an improved DACS with more fuel and thus greater divert capability. The increased speed and divert resulted in an interceptor design that has a much greater defended area than previous SM-3 variants. It also makes the interceptor more capable against faster, longer-range ballistic missiles, such as IRBMs and possibly ICBMs in their late midcourse or early descent phase.

SM-3 IIA flight testing has experienced several starts and fits. It had its first two flight tests in June and December 2015, and it achieved a successful intercept on its first attempt against an MRBM target in February 2017. It failed its following two intercept test attempts. In a flight against an IRBM target in June 2017, a sailor misidentified the intermediate-range target as friendly, causing the interceptor to self-destruct. The following intercept test in January 2018 also failed due to a malfunction in the interceptor’s third stage.

EPAA architects envisioned Phase IV as the final layer which would provide a defense for the U.S. homeland against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle East. This would be part of a layered defense in conjunction with the GMD system in Alaska and California. It was also to provide an earlier intercept capability against MRBM or IRBM heading to Europe than either the SM-3 IB or IIA could achieve. To accomplish these goals, the EPAA plan called for the development of an entirely new and much faster Standard Missile variant, the SM-3 IIB. The original timeline for IIB development called for a system requirements review by end of FY 2012, a contract award by the fourth quarter of FY 2013, and flight testing to get underway by 2016. A combination of technical, budgetary, and political struggles beset the effort, however, which led to its cancellation in 2013, and that of EPAA Phase IV writ large.

Aegis BMD Modernization and Baseline 9

Contemporaneous to the development of Aegis BMD, the Aegis Combat System more broadly had been undergoing considerable evolution as well since the late 1990s, changes that made the ACS capable of more complex tasks and even greater future potential. The advancement is Baseline 9, also known in the Aegis Modernization Program as Advanced Capability Build 12 (ACB12). Baseline 9 is arguably the most significant Baseline change yet for the ACS.

Among numerous enhancements, Baseline 9 completes the replaces the MILSPEC computers on Aegis platforms with commercial of the shelf computers which include both air defense and BMD functions in the same hardare mainframes. This along with the addition of a new multimission signal processor enables an Aegis Baseline 9 equipped platform to conduct BMD and air defense missions nearly simultaneously.

The newest Aegis upgrade, Baseline 10, is also underway and will incorporate the newer SPY-6 (AMDR) radar. Certification is expected in 2023 timeframe.

Footnotes

    1. Congressional Research Service, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” updated February 2021, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2021-02-25_RL33745_de476f52a2f7c053faa42651b79a7bb2580edb06.pdf.”
    2. Dan Lamonthe,  “To counter North Korea, admiral says the U.S. should consider adding ballistic missile interceptors in Hawaii,” The Washington Post, April 26, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/04/26/to-counter-north-korea-admiral-says-the-u-s-should-consider-adding-ballistic-missile-interceptors-in-hawaii/?utm_term=.21e745478bb1.
    3. Steven A. Hildreth, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Policy, Missions and Programs: Current Status, CRS Report No. 93-585F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1993), 16, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=439184
    4. Condoleezza Rice, “Missile Defense Papers” (official memorandum, Washington, DC: The White House, June 26, 2001), 2, http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/2425/2001-06-26%20from%20Condoleezza%20Rice%20re%20Missile%20Defense%20Papers.pdf#search=%22missile%20defense%20rice%22.4

      ABM Treaty provisions restricting sea-based defenses and other activities, however, formed a roadblock to the Bush Administration’s goal of creating a single, integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), one in which forward-deployed SPY-1 radars onboard U.S. Navy Aegis ships could contribute to the homeland missile defense mission, and that might eventually include sea-based interceptors for homeland defense. In early 2001, it became clear that the Administration intended to withdraw from the treaty. A June 2001 White House memo from Condoleezza Rice, for example, stated that “The United States intends to move beyond mutual assured destruction and the ABM Treaty,” further noting, “We plan to add additional tests of other technologies and basing modes, such as sea-based capabilities against longer-range missiles. As we have informed Russia and our allies these tests will come into conflict with the ABM Treaty in months, not years.” The administration formally announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty in December 2001.5 Rice, “Missile Defense Papers,” 2–3. Although not quite “months,” an Aegis SPY-1 radar would participate in its first homeland missile defense test, IFT-9, in October 2002. Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Intercept Test Successful,” news release, October 14, 2002, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/02archive0008.pdf.

    5. Missile Defense Agency, “First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea-Based Terminal Capability Successfully Completed,” news release, May 24, 2006, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/06fyi0079.pdf.
    6. Joseph T. Threston, “The Aegis Combat System,” Naval Engineers Journal 121, no.3 (October 2009):125.
    7. Missile Defense Program and Fiscal Year 2009 Budget before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, 111th Cong. (April 1, 2008) (testimony of Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III, USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency), 10, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_spring_08.pdf.
    8. Threston, “The Aegis Weapon System,” 106.
    9. The following Aegis BMD Version, 3.6, contained a multi-warfare upgrade that sought to shore up this weakness. It gave the ships a limited self-defense capability while conducting BMD operations. This upgrade was tested for the first time in April 2007, when USS Lake Erie successfully engaged a unitary short-range ballistic target and a simulated cruise missile with an SM-3 Block IA and an SM-2, respectively. The test was not particularly stressing on the system, but “demonstrated some level of capability for simultaneous ship self-defense and BMD functionality.”[note]

      The following Aegis BMD Version, 3.6, contained a multi-warfare upgrade that sought to shore up this weakness. It gave the ships a limited self-defense capability while conducting BMD operations. This upgrade was tested for the first time in April 2007, when USS Lake Erie successfully engaged a unitary short-range ballistic target and a simulated cruise missile with an SM-3 Block IA and an SM-2, respectively. The test was not particularly stressing on the system, but “demonstrated some level of capability for simultaneous ship self-defense and BMD functionality.”[note] Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD),” in FY 2007 Annual Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 224, http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2007/pdf/other/2007DOTEAnnualReport.pdf.

    10. President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe,” delivered in the Diplomatic Reception Room, The White House, Office of the Secretary, The White House, September 17, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-strengthening-missile-defense-europe.
    11. Hearing on Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 Before the U.S. Senate, Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 12 (July 11, 2014) (statement of Vice Admiral James D. Syring, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency) https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_syring_061114_sacd.pdf.
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Missile Defense Project, "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified August 4, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/system/aegis/.