Shahed-131 and 136

Last Updated 
May 22, 2026
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The Shahed-131 and -136 are one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) designed and produced by Iran. Since 2022, Russia has employed Shahed-131 and -136 UAVs extensively in its offensive campaign in Ukraine.

Shahed-131 and -136 at a Glance

Originated from
Iran
Possessed by
Iran and Russia
Class
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Status
Operational
Speed
180 km per hour
Alternate name (Shahed-131)
Geran-1 and Waid-1
Range (Shahed-131)
700 – 1,000 km
Length (Shahed-131)
2.6 m
Wingspan (Shahed-131)
2.2 m
Payload (Shahed-131)
10 – 20 kg
Weight (Shahed-131)
135 kg
In service (Shahed-131)
2019 – Present
Alternate name (Shahed-136)
Geran-2 and Waid-2
Range (Shahed-136)
1,000 – 2,500 km
Length (Shahed-136)
3.3 – 3.5 m
Wingspan (Shahed-136)
2.5 – 3 m
Payload (Shahed-136)
20 – 50 kg
Weight (Shahed-136)
200 kg
In service (Shahed-136)
2021 – Present
  • Shahed-136 displayed on the left and Shahed-131 displayed on the right at Iran’s National Aerospace Park in September 2023. Photo: Fars News Agency
  • Shahed-136 launchers on display at the Sacred Defense Week parade in 2023. Photo: Fars News Agency

Shahed-131 and -136 Development

To meet growing airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements, Iran sought alternatives to crewed fighter aircraft during the Iran-Iraq War. Universities, military institutions, and volunteer groups drove initial research efforts to produce radio-controlled aircraft fitted with analogue cameras.1 By the late 2000s and early 2010s, Iran increasingly emphasized UAV development for combat missions and to meet growing ISR requirements for an expanding and increasingly precise missile arsenal.2

As part of Iran’s efforts to develop simple and affordable capabilities, the Shahed Aviation Industries Group developed a copy of Israel’s Harpy anti-radiation UAV and equipped it with satellite navigation to produce the Shahed-131.3 The design was fitted with a more powerful engine and a larger frame to produce the longer-range Shahed-136.4

The Shahed-131 and -136 engines can be traced back to British and German designs and are largely based on commercial-grade products. The original Shahed-131 uses a 38-horsepower Serat-1 rotary Wankel engine that was reverse-engineered from the British AR731 engine.5 Iranian engineers similarly used German-designed Limbach L-550 motors to produce a 50-horsepower two-stroke, four-piston engine for the Shahed-136.6

The relatively low cost of the Shahed-131 and -136 UAVs from reliance on commercially available components has made them highly adaptable platforms, enabling significant modifications beyond Iran’s initial design. These modifications are likely to continue to meet evolving operational conditions. Analysts estimate that a Shahed has an approximate cost of $20,000 to $50,000.7 In terms of modifications, Russia has produced new warheads for the Shahed-136, and both Russia and Iran have changed the base color of some Shahed-136 UAVs to a matte black color to reduce detection at night and used materials that can likely scatter electromagnetic waves in the wing structure to reduce radar cross-section signatures.8 Iran has also reinforced the Shahed-136 with steel casing to improve its penetration capability against hardened targets before detonation.9

Specifications

Despite evolving designs, the Shahed-131 and -136 still share common features. Both are characterized as one-way attack UAVs and rely on copies of high-performance rotary engines for propulsion. In the Great Prophet 17 exercises, a tilting truck-mounted container, holding several UAVs, catapulted Shahed drones into the air through a short-burn rocket engine.10 Additionally, Iran and Russia reportedly also use single-UAV portable launchers, and the containers carrying Shahed UAVs can also be launched from railway train cars, ships, and other mobile vehicles. The Shahed-131 and -136 both have wing stabilizers, a short nose cone, pitot tubes, and a tube-like fuselage. Each contains two delta wings, four hinged rear fins to alter its trajectory, navigation systems, and a Global Navigation Satellite Systems antenna.11

The Shahed-131 has a range between 700 km and 1,000 km, with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimating a range of 900 km.12 The Shahed-131 can carry a payload of approximately 10 to 20 kg.13 The Shahed-131 has a length of approximately 2.6 meters, a wingspan of 2.2 meters, and a take-off weight of 135 kg.14

The Shahed-136 is larger, offers greater range, and can carry heavier payloads than the Shahed-131. Some estimate that the Shahed-136 has a range of 1,000 km to 2,000 km, while the DIA estimates that the Shahed-136 has a range of 2,500 km.15 The Shahed-136 can carry a payload of 20 kg to 50 kg. 16 The Shahed-136 has a length of approximately 3.3-3.5 meters, a wingspan of 2.5-3 meters, and a mass of 200 kg.17 The Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 reportedly have a speed of approximately 180 km per hour.18 The exact dimensions of both systems are likely to vary based on design modifications.

Service History

The Shahed-131 made its operational debut in UAV swarms targeting the Abqaiq and Khurais Saudi oil facilities in 2019. In 2021, Iran officially unveiled the Shahed-136 in the Great Prophet 17 exercises, indicating its operational status.19 From 2021 onward, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has made extensive use of Shahed-131 and -136 UAVs in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.20

In 2022, Russia began receiving shipments of Iranian Shahed UAVs and employing Shahed-136 drones against Ukrainian military targets.21 Russia has used Shahed-136 UAVs in structured attacks to target Ukrainian air defenses and its energy grid.22 By 2023, Russia and Iran had begun setting up production lines and manufacturing Shahed UAVs in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone.23 In Russia, the Shahed-131 UAVs are labelled as Geran-1, and the Shahed-136 UAVs are labelled as Geran-2.

By early 2024, the Houthis employed Shahed-136 UAVs against commercial vessels in the Red Sea.24 The Houthis refer to the Shahed-131 as Waid-1 and the Shahed-136 as Waid-2.25

The Iranians have employed Shahed-131 and -136 drones extensively against Israel, Persian Gulf states, and U.S. bases in the Gulf states during all four Operation True Promise missions. Operation True Promise I represented the first major attack against Israel directly from Iran and involved a mix of Shahed-131 and -136 UAVs, among other missiles.26 During Operation True Promise IV, Iran has used thousands of UAVs on pre-programmed paths, including Shahed-136 UAVs, to overwhelm air defenses, especially against targets along the Persian Gulf coastline.27 Over the course of Operation Epic Fury, the United States has also employed Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack Systems, a one-way-attack drone that is reverse engineered from Iran’s Shahed-136.28

Footnotes

    1. UAVs: ISR, Deterrence and War, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: Hobbs the Printers, March 2026), 60-61.
    2. Ibid, 60-61.
    3. Ibid, 60-61.
    4. Ibid, 60-61.
    5. Uzi Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile,” Royal United Services Institute, January 13, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile.
    6. Ibid.
    7. Neil Hollenbeck, Muhammed Hamza Altaf, Faith Avila, Javier Ramirez, Anurag Sharma, and Benjamin Jense, “Calculating the Cost-Effectiveness of Russia’s Drone Strikes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 19, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/calculating-cost-effectiveness-russias-drone-strikes.
    8. Joe Emmett, Trevor Ball, N.R. Jenzen-Jones, and Azul de Monte, “Shahed-131 & -136 UAVs: a visual guide,” Open Source Munitions Portal, https://osmp.ngo/collection/shahed-131-136-uavs-a-visual-guide/; David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso, “Alabuga’s Shahed 136 (Geran 2) Warheads: A Dangerous Escalation,” Institute for Science and International Security, May 9, 2024, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/alabugas-shahed-136-geran-2-warheads-a-dangerous-escalation; “Multipurpose Iranian drone warheads used in Ukraine,” Conflict Armament Research, February 2023, https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/f5070c1d8ff8451c9a99138a3b70232d.
    9. Ibid.
    10. Uzi Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile,” Royal United Services Institute, January 13, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile
    11. Joe Emmett, Trevor Ball, N.R. Jenzen-Jones, and Azul de Monte, “Shahed-131 & -136 UAVs: a visual guide,” Open Source Munitions Portal, https://osmp.ngo/collection/shahed-131-136-uavs-a-visual-guide/.
    12. Uzi Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile,” Royal United Services Institute, January 13, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile; “Iran Enabling Houthi Attacks Across the Middle East,” Defense Intelligence Agency, February 2024, 4. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf
    13. Ibid.
    14. Joe Emmett, Trevor Ball, N.R. Jenzen-Jones, and Azul de Monte, “Shahed-131 & -136 UAVs: a visual guide,” Open Source Munitions Portal, https://osmp.ngo/collection/shahed-131-136-uavs-a-visual-guide/; “Geran-1 (Shahed-131),” Ukraine War and Sanctions, last updated September 2, 2026. https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/uav/338.
    15. Uzi Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile,” Royal United Services Institute, January 13, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile; “Iran Enabling Houthi Attacks Across the Middle East,” Defense Intelligence Agency, February 2024, 4. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf.
    16. Uzi Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile,” Royal United Services Institute, January 13, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile; “Iran Enabling Houthi Attacks Across the Middle East,” Defense Intelligence Agency, February 2024, 6, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf.
    17. Uzi Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile,” Royal United Services Institute, January 13, 2021, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile; “Combined Arms Units to Combat Iranian-Made Strike UAVs ‘Shahed-136’ (‘Geran-2’) and the Russian Federation ‘Lancelet-2,’” Center for Operational Standards and Methods of Training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, March 2023, 9, https://mil.ee/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/2023_Ukrainian-handbook-C-UAS-ON-IRANIAN-MADE-SHAHED-136-GERAN-2-AND-LANCET-2-ASSOCIATION-AIRCRAFT.pdf
    18. Daniel Boffey, “Revealed: Europe’s role in the making of Russia killer drones,” The Guardian, September 27, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/27/revealed-europes-role-in-the-making-of-russia-killer-drones.
    19. “IRGC Tests Ballistic Missiles, Drones in War Game,” Iran Primer, December 28, 2021. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/dec/28/irgc-tests-ballistic-missiles-drones-war-game.
    20. For examples, see Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen As Red Sea Tensions Rise,” Newsweek, January 16, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/iran-suicide-drones-yemen-red-sea-tensions-1561395; Seth J. Frantzman, “Kurdish Iranian opposition groups say Iran targeted them in northern Iraq, claim operations in Iran,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 2, 2026, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/03/02/kurdish-iranian-opposition-groups-say-iran-targeted-them-in-northern-iraq-claim-operations-in-iran/; and Jeremy S. Watford and Ashley R. Jesser, “Expanding the Inherent Right to Self-Defense in a Counter-UAS Environment,” The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, no. 4, 2022, https://tjaglcs.army.mil/Periodicals/The-Army-Lawyer/tal-2022-issue-4/Post/4258/Practice-Notes-Expanding-the-Inherent-Right-to-SelfDefense-in-a-Counter-UAS-Environment.
    21. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Deploys Iranian Attack Drones, Ukrainian Military Says,” New York Times, September 18, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/18/world/europe/iran-attack-drones-ukraine.html.
    22. Nathan Hodge, “Ukraine’s counter-drone expertise has been hard won. War in the Middle East may reveal its silver lining,” CNN, March 7, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/03/07/world/ukraine-counter-drone-expertise-middle-east-intl-cmd.
    23. Clare Sebastian, Vasco Cotovio, Allegra Goodwin, and Daria Tarasova-Markina, “Russia lifts lid on secretive drone factory as satellite images reveal rapid expansion at key site,” CNN, July 25, 2025, https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/25/europe/russia-secretive-drone-factory-rapid-expansion-intl
    24. Simon Scarr, Adolfo Arranz, Jonathan Saul, Han Huang, Jitesh Chowdhurry, and Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa, “Red Sea attacks: How Houthi militants in Yemen are attacking ships in one of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes,” Reuters, February 2, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ISRAEL-PALESTINIANS/SHIPPING-ARMS/lgvdnngeyvo/.
    25. “Iran Enabling Houthi Attacks Across the Middle East,” Defense Intelligence Agency, February 2024, 6 and 8, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Iran_Houthi_Final2.pdf.
    26. “Iran’s Unprecedented Attack on Israel,” Iran Primer, April 15, 2024, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/apr/15/iran%E2%80%99s-unprecedented-attack-israel.
    27. Jane Lytvynenko and Frank Matt, “Videos and satellite images show Iran’s drone army puncturing U.S. and allied defenses,” NBC News, March 14, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/iran-drone-army-us-defense-video-image-shahed-attack-rcna262531.
    28. Ellie Cook, “Shahed and Made It ‘Indispensable,’” Newsweek, April 1, 2026, https://www.newsweek.com/us-copied-iran-famous-shahed-made-it-indispensable-11761521.
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Missile Defense Project, "Shahed-131 and 136," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 22, 2026, last modified May 22, 2026, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shahed-131-and-136/.