



NEWS RELEASE

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DOD REVIEW RECOMMENDS REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR FORCE

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry today announced the results of the Department of Defense's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

"In light of the post-Cold War era, President Bill Clinton directed the Defense Department to reexamine its forces," said Secretary Perry. "First, there was the Bottom Up Review of U. S. conventional force structure conducted under Secretary Aspin. Now we have just completed a review of our nuclear forces."

The NPR is the first such review of U.S. nuclear policy in 15 years, and the first study ever to include policy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, operations, supporting infrastructure, safety and security and arms control in a single review.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

The most important results of the Nuclear Posture Review can be seen in the decisions made to reduce the strategic nuclear force structure the U.S. plans to retain after the START II Treaty is implemented. The NPR recommends the following strategic nuclear force adjustments:

-- Fourteen Trident submarines carrying Trident II (D-5) missiles -- retiring four submarines-- rather than 18 submarines, 10 carrying D-5 and 8 carrying C-4 missiles.

-- Sixty-six B-52 bombers, reduced from the 94 planned a year ago.

-- No requirement for any additional B-2 bombers in a nuclear role.

-- All B-1 bombers will be reoriented to a conventional role.

-- Three wings of Minuteman III missiles carrying single warheads (500-450).

No new strategic systems are under development or planned.

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“NPR decisions allow us to put U.S. nuclear programs on a stable footing. But a fundamental underlying judgment of the Review is that we are at the threshold of a decade of planned reductions, and we will continue to reassess the opportunities for further reduction or, if necessary, respond to unanticipated challenges as time goes on. The NPR strategic force provides that needed flexibility,” Secretary Perry said.

NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

In the Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF) arena, the NPR makes the following recommendations, including eliminating entirely two of five remaining types of NSNF:

- Retain our current commitment to NATO of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe (less than 10 percent of Cold War levels).
- Retain continental U.S.-based dual-capable aircraft.
- Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based dual-capable aircraft.
- Eliminate the option to carry nuclear cruise missiles on surface ships.
- Retain the capability to deploy nuclear cruise missiles on submarines.

The effect of the NSNF recommendations is to eliminate the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on surface naval ships, while maintaining a non-strategic force capability to fulfill our commitments to allies.

NUCLEAR SAFETY, SECURITY AND USE CONTROL

In addition to the reductions on overall numbers of weapons as noted above, since 1988 the U.S. has taken a number of steps to improve the safety and security of nuclear weapons. U.S. bombers no longer stand day-to-day alert and strategic missiles are no longer targeted against any country. The U.S. has reduced the number of nuclear storage locations by over 75 percent and the number of personnel with access to weapons or control by 70 percent. The NPR examined ways to ensure U.S. ability to continue to meet the highest standards of stewardship of its nuclear forces and identified several areas for further improvements in U.S. forces' safety, security and use control. The NPR recommends that:

- the U.S. equip all its nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices by 1997; and upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers.

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COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

While dramatic changes have taken place in the area of command, control, communications and intelligence, the NPR recommendations ensure that our C3I structure will continue to be able to carry out key missions to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent capability.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The NPR also made a number of recommendations regarding the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear forces. The Department will work closely with the Department of Energy, under the aegis of the stockpile stewardship program, to maintain a reliable, safe nuclear stockpile under a comprehensive test ban treaty. The U.S. will maintain selected portions of the defense industrial base that are unique to strategic and other nuclear systems.

THREAT REDUCTION AND PROLIFERATION

The NPR recommended that the U.S. take advantage of the new opportunities for threat reduction through cooperative engagement; supports the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program to reduce the danger of unauthorized/accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from or within the former Soviet Union. It also supports the U.S. Counterproliferation initiative to enhance conventional responses to the use of weapons of mass destruction in regional conflict.

"The NPR decisions allow us to put our nuclear programs in DoD on a stable footing after several years of rapid changes in our forces and programs. These adjustments reflect the changed political situation at the end of the Cold War and the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security," said Dr. Perry.

"As we make adjustments in our future plans for the U.S. nuclear posture, uppermost in our minds is the fact that the states of the former Soviet Union are yet in the early stages of implementing the agreed reductions called for by the START I and START II agreements," Dr. Perry said. "We are trying to hasten that process through, among other things, our Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. But we kept in mind as we conducted the NPR that START I has not yet entered into force, nor has START II be ratified. For this reason, and because of the uncertain future of the rapid political and economic change still underway in the former Soviet Union, we made two judgments in the NPR.

"First, we concluded that deeper reductions beyond those we made in the NPR would be imprudent at this time; and second, we took several actions to ensure that we could reconstitute our forces as the decade went along, if we needed to," Secretary Perry said.

"The results of the NPR strike an appropriate balance between showing U.S. leadership in responding to the changed international environment and hedging against an uncertain future," he said.

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BACKGROUND: REDUCTIONS IN U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES UNDERWAY

Since 1988, the U.S. has made a number of significant changes in its nuclear posture:

- The total U.S. active nuclear stockpile has been reduced 59 percent and will be reduced a total of 79 percent by 2003.
- Strategic warheads have been reduced 47 percent to date and will be reduced a total of 71 percent by 2003 with the implementation of START I and START II.
- Strategic bombers have been taken off alert.
- Nuclear weapons storage locations have been reduced by over 75 percent.
- We have eliminated the nuclear roles of the Army and the Marines. The Navy no longer routinely deploys non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the Air Force has dramatically cut its tactical nuclear stockpile.

We have terminated almost all of our nuclear modernization programs.

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Nuclear Posture Review

Why We Have Nuclear Weapons

"Even with the Cold War over, our nation must maintain military forces that are sufficient to deter diverse threats."

"We will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. Therefore we will continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by such political and military leaders."

"A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems."

**President William J. Clinton
NSS July 1994**

Why Review US Nuclear Posture?

- ☐ **First comprehensive review in 15 years**
- ☐ **New security environment**
 - ☐ Reduction in conventional threat in Europe
 - ☐ Threat posed by Russia reduced . . . different
 - ☐ Continuing political/economic reform in FSU
 - ☐ Regional threats more important than before
- ☐ **DoD budget constraints**
- ☐ **Substantial reductions underway and planned**
 - ☐ Stock-taking needed
 - ☐ Need to rebalance infrastructure, industrial and technology bases
 - ☐ Need to maintain quality people

Effects of the Changing Security Environment

Security Environment

End of Cold War

Growing WMD Proliferation

Regional Engagement

Impact

- Conventional threat from FSU especially to Europe decreases
- Improving relationship with Russia
- Uncertainty in FSU political and economic changes
- Continuing large Russian nuclear arsenal
- Increased prevalence of regional conflicts
- US and Allies face WMD threat
- FSU "loose" nukes
- Regional competitors seek high leverage to offset US conventional forces

Implications

- Smaller role for nuclear weapons in US security strategy
- Focus on threat reduction in FSU
- Explore further relaxation in alert posture
- Explore further force reductions
- Improve storage and security
- Nuclear deterrence still important; responsible stewardship of enduring arsenal without underground nuclear tests
- Retain roughly equivalent forces
- Maintain alliance commitments
- Maintain conventional forces capability to win two MRCs (BUR)
- Reinforce policies to prevent proliferation
- Develop conventional capabilities to deter, defeat, defend against WMD proliferation on the battlefield

Overview

- ☐ **NPR Process**
- ☐ **Perspective**
- ☐ **Strategic Forces**
- ☐ **Non-Strategic Forces**
- ☐ **C3I**
- ☐ **Infrastructure**
- ☐ **Safety, Security, and Use Control**
- ☐ **Initiatives**
- ☐ **Summary**

Part I: NPR Process

NPR Structure

US Security
Strategy

The Role of Nuclear
Weapons In US Security

Counterproliferation
Policy

Deterrence
Strategy

Threat Reduction
Policy

Contingencies, Missions,
and Capabilities


Declaratory
Policy

Force Structure
and Infrastructure

Plans, Operations,
and C3

Safety, Security,
and Use Control

DoD-Wide Collaborative Effort



Part II: Perspective

A Historical Perspective

- ☐ Significant reductions in US nuclear forces are underway
 - ☐ Weapons (since 1988)
 - ☐ Total active stockpile reduced by 59%
 - ☐ Strategic warheads reduced by 47%
 - ☐ Non-strategic nuclear force warheads reduced by 90%
 - ☐ No nuclear weapons remain in the custody of US ground forces
 - ☐ Operations
 - ☐ Strategic bombers taken off day-to-day alert
 - ☐ ICBMs and SLBMs detargeted
 - ☐ More SSBNs patrolling on "modified alert" rather than "alert"
 - ☐ Naval NSNF no longer routinely deployed at sea
 - ☐ Reduced airborne command and control operations tempo
 - ☐ Programmatic (1989-Present)

Program Terminations

- Small ICBM
- Peacekeeper Rail Garrison
- Lance Follow-on
- New Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile
- Tactical Air to Surface Missile
- Short Range Attack Missile II





Program Truncations

- Peacekeeper
- B-2
- B-1 Nuclear Role
- Advanced Cruise Missile
- W-88


Systems Retired: No Replacement

- Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile
- FB-111
- Minuteman II
- Lance
- Short Range Attack Missile-A
- Nuclear Depth Bomb
- C-3 SSBN

A Historical Perspective




Adjusted Nuclear Posture



Part III: Strategic Forces

Force Structure Paths: Protecting Options In An Uncertain World



Military Requirement for US Strategic Nuclear Forces

- ☐ **Force plans for 2003:**
 - ☐ Based on projected military requirements
 - ☐ Assume implementation of START I and START II
- ☐ **Capabilities of Former Soviet Union (FSU) remain primary concern**
 - ☐ Do not target Russia (or anyone else) today, *but . . .*
 - ☐ Must be prepared for possible emergence of hostile government in Russia or failure of arms control process in the FSU

Platform Attributes

- ☐ **Submarines**

- ☐ Survivable ➡ Stability

- ☐ **Bombers**

- ☐ Survivable (when on alert) ➡ Stability
- ☐ Hedge against catastrophic failure of SSBN leg
- ☐ Dual capable--can help in conventional contingencies

- ☐ **ICBMs**

- ☐ Significant upload hedge
- ☐ Ability to strike selectively

Post-START II Force Structure 2003

☐ **SSBNs**

- ☐ 14 SSBNs (retire 4)
- ☐ All with D-5 missiles
- ☐ Retain 2 bases (Kings Bay and Bangor)

☐ **Bombers**

- ☐ 66 B-52s (28 fewer)
- ☐ Non-nuclear role for B-1
- ☐ No more than 20 B-2s required for nuclear mission

☐ **ICBMs**

- ☐ Maintain three wings of Minuteman ICBMs (500/450 missiles)

Options Reviewed to Achieve Faster/Deeper Reductions

- ☐ **Accelerate implementation of START I/II**
 - ☐ **Seek accelerated FSU warhead removals to START I levels**
 - ☐ **Early deactivation/acceleration of START II implementation with US assistance**
- ☐ **Negotiate new agreement for faster and deeper reductions**
- ☐ **Explore sufficiency of US forces below START II levels....Unilateral reduction**

Warhead Upload Hedge

- ☐ **Must preserve options for uploading/reconstituting US nuclear forces should . . .**
 - ☐ **Political relations with Russia change for the worse**
 - ☐ **START I and START II not be fully implemented**
- ☐ **NPR strategic force capable of providing necessary hedge through**
 - ☐ **START II declaratory RV loading**
 - ☐ **Where possible in near term, maintenance of platforms**

Part IV: Non-Strategic Forces

Non-Strategic Nuclear Force Structure

- ☐ **USAF Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA)**
 - ☐ **Maintain Alliance commitment**
 - ☐ **Maintain current strength in CONUS and Europe**
- ☐ **USN Carrier DCA and nuclear TOMAHAWK (TLAM/N)**
 - ☐ **Eliminate carrier and surface ship nuclear weapons capability**
 - ☐ **Maintain capability to deploy TLAM/N on SSNs**

Part V:
Command, Control, Communications
and
Intelligence (C3I)

Post-Cold War C3I and Operations

- ☐ **Cold War nuclear force posture modified**
 - ☐ Bombers off alert
 - ☐ More SSBNs patrolling on "Modified-Alert" rather than "Alert"
 - ☐ ICBMs and SLBMs detargeted
 - ☐ Reduced command post structure
 - ☐ Reduced Airborne Command & Control Ops Tempo (NEACP, TACAMO, ABNCP)
- ☐ **Nevertheless, to maintain deterrence, must carry out key missions**
 - ☐ Early warning
 - ☐ Threat assessment
 - ☐ Connectivity to national leadership
 - ☐ Message dissemination
 - ☐ Safe, secure force management

Strategic C3I Requirements

- ☐ **Continue adequate funding of critical programs**
- ☐ **Correct existing/projected communication system and tactical warning/attack assessment deficiencies**
- ☐ **Support intelligence systems which provide timely information and threat characterization warning indicators**

Part VI: Infrastructure

Infrastructure Requirements

- ☐ **Replace guidance system and re-motor Minuteman III**
- ☐ **Continue D-5 production past 1995 to maintain missile industrial base**
- ☐ **Fund sustainment of guidance systems and maintain reentry vehicle industrial base**
- ☐ **No specific bomber infrastructure funding necessary for nuclear mission**

Infrastructure Requirements (Cont)

- ☐ **DoD requirements to DOE**
 - ☐ **Maintain nuclear weapon capability (without underground nuclear testing or fissile material production)**
 - ☐ **Develop stockpile surveillance engineering base**
 - ☐ **Demonstrate capability to refabricate and certify weapon types in enduring stockpile**
 - ☐ **Maintain capability to design, fabricate, and certify new warheads**
 - ☐ **Maintain science and technology base**
 - ☐ **Ensure tritium availability**
 - ☐ **No new-design nuclear warhead production**

Part VII:

Safety, Security, and Use Control

US Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control

- ☐ **No nuclear weapons remain in the custody of US ground forces**
- ☐ **Naval NSNF no longer deployed at sea**
- ☐ **Strategic bombers taken off day-to-day alert**
- ☐ **Since 1988, total active stockpile reduced by 59% (79% by 2003)**
 - ☐ **Strategic warheads reduced by 47% (71% by 2003)**
 - ☐ **NSNF warheads cut by 90%**
 - ☐ **NATO stockpile cut by 91%**
- ☐ **Storage locations reduced by over 75%**
- ☐ **Personnel with access to weapons or control cut by 70%**

US Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control Recommendations

- ☐ Upgrade coded control device (CCD) components on the B-52 and Minuteman III
- ☐ Retire Minuteman W-62 warhead
- ☐ Optimize number of accident/incident teams
- ☐ Continue Implementation of FARR recommendations by seeking alternatives for those recommendations that test moratorium may preclude
- ☐ Complete Trident CCD in 1997 (means system level coded control devices or PALs will be on all US nuclear weapons by 1997)
- ☐ Implement a regular and realistic nuclear procedures exercise program with participation by senior DoD civilian and military leadership

Part VIII: Initiatives

Counterproliferation Initiatives

- ☐ **Develop effective theater defenses against ballistic missile and air-breathing threats**
- ☐ **Enhance conventional capabilities to counter the proliferation threat and support funding for principal Deutch Committee report recommendations**
 - ☐ **Improved real-time detection and characterization of BW/CW agents**
 - ☐ **Underground structures detection and characterization**
 - ☐ **Hard underground target defeat, including advanced non-nuclear weapons producing low collateral damage**
- ☐ **Provide DoD capabilities in support of UN and other international non-proliferation efforts**
- ☐ **Fully implement nuclear arms control agreements and support NPT, BWC, and CWC**
- ☐ **Continue assistance to FSU to enhance safety and security of nuclear weapons**

Initiatives Considered for Improving Russian Safety, Security, and Use Control

Forces

- ☐ Further NSNF reductions
- ☐ Accelerating removal of warheads down to START II levels
- ☐ Further SNF reductions beyond START II
- ☐ Removing warheads from all ICBMs

Operational Practices

- ☐ Cooperative warning and verification of alert status
- ☐ Delaying ICBM/SLBM launch ability

Weapon Stockpile

- ☐ Stockpile data exchange
- ☐ Transparency/acceleration of warhead dismantlement
- ☐ Stockpile inventory cap
- ☐ Storing weapons/material under international custody

Part IX: Summary

Conclusions

- ☐ **Post-Cold War environment requires nuclear deterrent**
 - ☐ Rebalanced Triad
 - ☐ START II levels remain in US interest until START I implementation complete, Russia nears START II levels, and we're confident of Russia's future
- ☐ **Major reductions and cost savings underway**
 - ☐ US forces will be smaller, safer, more secure and maintained at lower alert rates
 - ☐ Reduce infrastructure, but maintain people and technical base
- ☐ **US Nuclear Posture must help shape future**
 - ☐ Create world in which role of nuclear weapons reduced
 - ☐ Stem proliferation
 - ☐ Preserve options if reform falls in Russia
 - ☐ Maintain good stewardship
- ☐ **Difficult but vital challenge for US Posture is to both lead and hedge**

Main Results of the NPR

☐ **Strategic Forces**

- ☐ No more than 20 B-2 bombers required for nuclear role
- ☐ Reduce B-52 bomber force (94 to 66)
- ☐ Reduce Trident submarine fleet size from 18 to 14; but modernize SLBM force for very long service life by equipping all submarines with D-5 missiles
- ☐ Maintain single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs (500/450)
- ☐ Maintain flexibility to reduce further or reconstitute

☐ **Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces**

- ☐ Maintain European NSNF commitment at current level (less than 10% of Cold War level)
- ☐ Eliminate nuclear weapons capability from US Navy surface ships
 - ☐ Eliminate nuclear DCA capability from aircraft carriers
 - ☐ Eliminate nuclear cruise missile capability from surface combatants
- ☐ Retain nuclear cruise missile capability on submarines
- ☐ Retain land-based dual-capable nuclear aircraft capability

Main Results of the NPR (Cont)

- ☐ **Safety, Security, and Use Control**
 - ☐ Equip all US nuclear weapons systems, including submarines, with coded control devices or PAL by 1997
 - ☐ Upgrade coded control locking devices on Minuteman III ICBMs and B-52 bombers
 - ☐ Conduct regular NCA procedural exercises
- ☐ **Infrastructure**
 - ☐ Stockpile stewardship "customer plan" for DoE
 - ☐ Sustain ballistic missile industrial base by Minuteman III sustainment and D-5 production
 - ☐ Sustain reentry vehicle and guidance system industrial base
- ☐ **Command, Control, Communications, & Intelligence and Operations**
 - ☐ Continue adjustments to post-Cold War alert/operational requirements
 - ☐ Support selected C3I programs for assured NCA survivability and continuity
- ☐ **Threat Reduction and Proliferation**
 - ☐ Support Cooperative Threat Reduction program to promote steps to prevent unauthorized/accidental use or diversion of weapons or materials from/within the FSU
 - ☐ Support counterproliferation initiative to provide conventional responses to use of WMD in regional conflict